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The paper formalizes, in a rigorous manner, the concept of information externalities, by modeling R&D 
activities as the process of searching for a drug to treat a disease, with R&D activities being modeled from the 
perspective of the theory of optimal search. In conventional models of patent design, only one brand - the 
brand with the highest quality - is available on the market at any time. Furthermore, demand is completely 
inelastic: each consumer, regardless of income and regardless of the price of the brand offered on the market, 
buys exactly one unit of the brand. In this model, which is a dynamic model in continuous time, several 
differentiated products - the products whose patents are still in force and the products whose patents have 
expired - are available at any time on the market. Furthermore, the demand for a brand depends on income, 
its own price, and the prices of the other brands. The analyses of R&D as well as the impact of the cost and 
the quality of newly discovered drugs on the market are represented under this framework, when the 
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1 Introduction 
In the economics of science and technology, economists distinguish between basic research and 
applied research. The objective of basic research is to increase our knowledge about natural 
phenomena, not to develop specific applications of this stock of knowledge for pecuniary gains. 
However, applied research – often called R&D or innovation in the economic literature – is 
driven by profits, and a firm carries out applied research in order to develop a new product or to 
find a more efficient production process. Another difference between basic research and applied 
research is that the discoveries of basic research are widely published and freely available to all 
researchers, while the results of R&D activities are jealously guarded secrets of the organizations 
that discover them in their efforts to appropriate all the benefits from these discoveries.  
 
The economic analysis of basic research concentrates on the social value of the increase in the 
stock of fundamental knowledge. The social value of an increase in the stock of fundamental 
knowledge is difficult to measure, or even to predict. Because basic research takes place at the 
frontier of knowledge, the economic benefits of a program of basic research are highly uncertain. 
Furthermore, because scientific discoveries are difficult to establish or to defend, it is almost 
impossible to define the property rights of these discoveries. The difficulty involved in the 
definition of property rights in basic research implies that discoverers of new fundamental 
knowledge cannot appropriate all the commercial benefits of their research, and this form of 
market failure is the basis for the assertion that the level of investment in basic research is 
socially sub-optimal. This fact is reflected in the modest share of basic research in the R&D 
budget of profit-driven firms. Yet for a program of basic research, the social value can greatly 
exceed its private value because advancements in fundamental knowledge constitute important 
inputs in many applied research programs and innovations.  
 
Although R&D is profit-driven and mission-oriented, it shares one important characteristic with 
basic research: information externalities. The information generated by the R&D activities of a 
firm might help other firms in their search for a new product or a new process with lower costs. 
Revealing the results of its R&D activities to rival firms reduces a firm’s competitive edge in its 
competition for profits and market share. This is the reason why firms keep the results of their 
R&D activities secret. However, rival firms can appropriate the fruits of the R&D activities of 
other firms through imitation, reverse engineering, or information spillovers. These factors tend 
to reduce the incentive of a firm to carry out R&D activities, and a solution to this problem is to 
offer some protection to a firm’s innovation by granting it a patent.  
 
Nordhaus (1969) was the first researcher to offer a rigorous analysis of the fundamental trade-off 
between static efficiency and dynamic efficiency in the design of patent policy. A patent gives its 
owner the intellectual property right to exploit the fruit of her discoveries, which encourages 
innovation, and thus benefits society. This is the source of dynamic efficiency behind the 
granting of a patent. However, offering protection to an innovation allows the holder of the 
patent to exercise monopoly power, which is the source of static inefficiency. The model of 
Nordhaus, op cit., deals with the length of a patent, i.e., the number of years that the patent is in 
force.2 It proposes complete protection of an innovation for a limited number of years, and can 
be taken as a simple description of the patent system in its original purpose. However, since the 
pioneering work of Mansfield (1961), researchers have found an overwhelming volume of 
evidence on the inability of patents to prevent imitation. According to Mansfield (1984), about 
60% of patented products were successfully imitated within four years of patenting. Nordhaus 
(1972) dealt with the issue of imitation by adding a second dimension – patent breadth or patent 
width – to his original model. Intuitively, the patent breadth captures the minimum degree of 
novelty relative to the product purportedly protected by the patent that a rival product must 
possess so that it can be judged as not infringing on the patent.  
 
Although the concept of patent breadth is intuitively appealing, its meaning is vague. Nordhaus 
(1972) deals with process innovation, and the breadth of a patent is taken as the fraction of cost 
reduction not freely flowing to rival firms through spillovers. Klemperer (1990) analyzed patent 
breadth in the context of a model of spatially differentiated products. The distance in space 
between the patent holder’s product and a rival product represents the transport cost that a 
consumer must pay if she buys the rival brand. The breadth of a patent is defined as the radius 
beyond which a rival product is considered as not to infringe upon the patent. Klemperer took the 
prize of the patent, i.e., the discounted profits enjoyed by the patent holder, as given, and 
determined the length and breadth of the patent that minimizes the social cost subject to the 
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 In the US, the statutory life of a patent is about 17 years. 
constraint that the patent holder earns the given prize. In the model of Gilbert and Shapiro 
(1990), patent breadth is simply defined as the flow rate of profit that a patent holder is allowed 
to earn while the patent is in force. The model is in reduced form, and the optimal length and 
breadth for the patent are found by maximizing discounted social welfare subject to the 
constraint that the patent holder is allowed to earn a certain level of profits. What this level of 
profits is was not specified by these researchers; neither was it explained in Klemperer’s model. 
The varied definitions of patent breadth in the literature lead to an array of bewildering results. In 
some cases, the optimal patent has maximum length, but minimum breadth. In other cases, it is 
the opposite result. And in some other circumstances, the length-breadth mix makes no 
difference.3  A consensus on the definition of patent breadth is yet to emerge. 
In the earlier literature on patent design, all efforts were concentrated on finding the optimal 
length and breadth of a patent. The role of information externalities was not considered. Indeed, 
one of the conditions for granting a patent is that the holder of the patent must provide a 
disclosure of all the technical information that enables another researcher to replicate all the 
results claimed by the patent. Furthermore, the analysis was carried out in the context of a single 
innovation, and the inherent uncertainties in R&D activities were ignored. An exception was 
Scotchmer and Green (1990), who formulated a simple dynamic economic model that 
incorporates patent breadth and the incentive of firms to keep secret their R&D results.  
 
In the model of Scotchmer and Green, there are only two possible innovations: a weak 
innovation and a strong innovation. The weak innovation represents a slight improvement in the 
quality of the product in question, while the strong innovation represents a more pronounced 
improvement of the product. The weak innovation yields one extra unit of welfare in perpetuity, 
while the strong innovation yields two extra units of social welfare in perpetuity. R&D activities 
are driven by research expenditures, and the discovery time is modelled as the arrival of a 
Poisson process. In the model, the information externalities were modelled in the following 
manner. The weak innovation requires one Poisson hit, while the strong innovation requires two 
Poisson hits. If a firm has obtained a Poisson hit, then it only needs another Poisson hit to obtain 
strong innovation. If the technical information obtained by the firm that obtained the first 
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 See Tandon (1982) for a discussion and a reconciliation of these contradictory results in a very simple model of the 
optimal length and breadth of a patent.    
Poisson hit is disclosed to the other firm, which has not made any Poisson hit, then the latter firm 
can benefit from the information disclosure and only needs one Poisson hit to obtain strong 
innovation. On the other hand, if the former firm does not patent its weak innovation, then the 
latter firm must make two Poisson hits to obtain strong innovation.  
 
O’Donoghue et al. (1998) formulated a model in which firms sequentially improve the products 
of each other through time, and technological progress occurs when a non-infringing innovation 
displaces a patented product. In this model, innovations are ideas that arrive in a random manner 
according to a Poisson process, and there is an infinite sequence of possible innovations. An idea 
is an ordered pair of numbers, with the first component representing the quality improvement of 
the innovation, and the second component the investment required to realize the innovation. If 
the investment embodied in the idea is not made, the idea is lost. There are no strategic 
interactions among firms, and a patent ceases to exist either when it reaches the end of its 
statutory life or when it is displaced by a better and non-infringing product.  
 
The purported goal of a patent policy is to encourage technological progress. Yet, its impact on 
the pace of technological progress has largely been ignored by researchers in this field. 
Compared to the models of R&D in the literature on trade and technological progress, the model 
of R&D found in the literature of optimal patent design is much less sophisticated. In the 
research program on trade and technological progress of Eaton and Kortum (2001), ideas 
(discoveries) arrive in time according to a Poisson process whose parameter depends on the stock 
of knowledge – taken to be the cumulative effort of research workers. An idea is a draw from a 
Pareto distribution, and the draw represents the efficiency of producing the good by the 
technology just discovered. Using the stock of knowledge to represent the parameter of the 
Poisson process that characterizes the arrival in time of ideas does capture the effect of 
cumulative knowledge gained from R&D activities. However, this aggregate variable is not 
capable of capturing the impact of information externalities. To formalize the information 
externalities in a rigorous manner, we need to descend to a more disaggregate level and model 
how the findings from the R&D activities of one research organization can have a positive 
impact on the R&D activities of other research organizations. The objective of our paper is to fill 
part of this lacuna in the literature.  
 To fix ideas, and also to rigorously formalize the concept of information externalities, we have 
chosen to model R&D activities as the process of searching for a drug to treat a disease, with 
R&D activities being modelled from the perspective of the theory of optimal search and where 
the search is being conducted on chemical compounds housed in distinct chemical libraries. The 
main reason for formulating the R&D process in the context of the pharmaceutical industry is 
because much knowledge has been gained in the process of drug discovery, and this allows for a 
less abstract modeling of the R&D process.  
 
In the model we formulate, it is a given that several brands of a drug are available at any instant 
for treating a single disease, and that pharmaceutical firms are carrying out R&D activities to 
find a new drug to treat the disease. It is assumed that the patent on each brand is held by a single 
pharmaceutical firm, and that after the patent for a brand has expired, the brand can be 
manufactured as a generic drug by a competitive fringe. Furthermore, pharmaceutical firms 
behave strategically both in the product market and in R&D. Under this structure, three scenarios 
are discussed: the first scenario refers to the case where all chemical compounds in all chemical 
libraries are already screened. The second scenario discusses the case where the set of 
unscreened chemical compounds include only one element. Under this scenario it is shown that 
the firm which holds the earlier-expiring patent only chooses to screen the last compound, when 
the patent it holds expires, if the expected discounted payoff net of R&D costs yielded by this 
action is positive. The expected discounted payoff net of R&D costs obtained by this firm is then 
decreasing in the cost of screening; increasing in the cumulative quality discovered in the past 
screenings of the compounds in the chemical library, and decreasing in the number of past 
screenings carried out in this chemical library. The payoff is also higher if the marginal cost of 
the drug manufactured from the last compound is lower, and higher if the qualities (marginal 
costs) of all the other brands – generic drugs as well as the brands whose patents have not 
expired – are lower (higher). It is also shown that if the firm which holds the earlier-expiring 
patent chooses not to screen the last compound when the patent it holds expires, the firm which 
holds the patent on the rival brand will not choose to screen the last compound when its patent 
expires. The expected discounted payoff earned by the rival brand is shown to be decreasing in 
the cumulative quality discovered in the chemical library, and increasing in the number of past 
screenings in the chemical library; increasing (decreasing) in the quality (marginal cost) of the 
brand and decreasing (increasing) in the qualities (marginal costs) of the generic drugs as well as 
the brand whose patent has not expired.  
 
The third scenario refers to the case where the set of unscreened chemical compounds includes 
two elements. These elements may be located in two different chemical libraries, or both being 
located in the same chemical library. Under the first case the analysis suggests that if neither 
compound is screened by the firm which holds the earlier-expiring patent when it stands alone as 
the single remaining compound, then it will not be screened either by this firm when it is one of 
the two remaining compounds. It is also shown that the expected discounted payoff net of R&D 
costs that the firm which holds the earlier-expiring patent obtains by screening each of the last 
two compounds is positive, then, every other thing equal, the compound with the lower screening 
cost should be screened first, the compound from which a new drug with much higher marginal 
cost is manufactured should not be screened first, and the compound with the potential quality 
that is stochastically much larger should be screened first. When the elements are both located in 
the same chemical library the penultimate compound in the chemical library is screened by the 
firm which holds the earlier-expiring patent, and if the revealed quality of the penultimate 
compound, is particularly high, then the probability that the quality of the last compound in the 
chemical library is higher than the quality of the penultimate compound is particularly low, 
which means the last compound will not be screened.    
 
Drug discovery is a long and arduous process.4 A pharmaceutical company employs thousands of 
researchers to find new drugs that can help people with various diseases. In spite of all the 
progress made in science and technology, drug discovery is still a lengthy and costly process. In 
2000 the global R&D investment was $US 55 billion.5 On average it takes up to 15 years to 
develop and test a new drug, and the required investments might rise to $US 600 million.  
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In the past, drugs were discovered either by identifying active ingredients in traditional remedies 
or by serendipity. In the new paradigm of drug discovery, researchers first try to understand how 
a disease is controlled at the molecular and physiological levels. The knowledge gained at this 
stage helps identify a target, which is the specific cellular or molecular structure involved in the 
pathology. Next, through a process known as high-throughput screening (HTS) large libraries of 
chemicals are tested for their ability to modify the target. It is estimated that only about 1 in 5000 
chemicals thus tested results in a lead. Through miniaturization and robotics, it is now possible to 
screen millions of compounds against targets in a very short period of time. Central to the new 
paradigm of drug discovery is the explosion of computational techniques that help analyze 
enormous volumes of data, prioritize HTS hits, and guide lead optimization. If a pharmaceutical 
company decides to develop a lead into a drug, the drug thus developed must go through a series 
of clinical trials before it can be approved by the authorities. In order for a drug to be approved it 
must exhibit therapeutic effects against the target and prove non-toxic to the patient.  
 
Novel chemical structures (new drugs) can be found among natural products or from libraries of 
synthetic compounds created by combinatorial chemistry.6 The vast majority of traditionally 
used crude drugs in Western medicine come from roots, leaves, and flowers of plants, and a pool 
of information about the potential of plant species – as a source of novel chemical structure – has 
been accumulated. The knowledge gained from ethno-botany can prove to be valuable in 
narrowing down the search for novel chemical structures among plants. Microbes compete for 
living space and food. The chemical structures that they have developed to compete against other 
species – because they have been tested and proved to be effective in their struggles for survival 
– can be sources of new drugs. Recently, some novel chemical structures have been found 
among marine invertebrates.     
 
A guiding principle in the search for a novel chemical structure is the concept of chemical 
diversity,7 which represents the current knowledge concerning the distribution of chemical 
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 In the past, chemists traditionally synthesized one compound at a time. With the modern technique of 
combinatorial chemistry, a large number of structurally distinct molecules can be synthesized at a time, and then 
submitted for pharmacological assay.  
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 Chemical diversity is an important concept in the discipline known as chemo-informatics, which is the application 
of informatics methods to solve chemical problems. Chemo-informatics involves the study of chemical information 
or molecular similarity and the development of computational methods for the identification and optimization of 
compounds – based on their physicochemical characteristics – in the chemical space. An 
efficient search strategy, which tells us where to search for a novel chemical structure at any 
point in time, whether to continue or stop the search, or whether to go to another source to search 
for the desired novel chemical structure should exploit our knowledge concerning the chemical 
diversity of the various sources. Furthermore, because R&D in the pharmaceutical industry is 
profit-driven, the search for a novel chemical structure also depends on economics – search 
costs, production costs, competition from rival firms, and the appropriability of the discoveries.   
 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the model, which is a dynamic model in 
continuous time, is presented. In conventional models of patent design, only one brand – the 
brand with the highest quality – is available on the market at any time. Furthermore, demand is 
completely inelastic: each consumer, regardless of income and regardless of the price of the 
brand offered on the market, buys exactly one unit of the brand. In the model we formulate, 
several differentiated products – the products whose patents are still in force and the products 
whose patents have expired – are available at any time on the market. Furthermore, the demand 
for a brand depends on income, its own price, and the prices of the other brands. In our model, 
the pharmaceutical firms with an active drug discovery program behave strategically in both 
R&D and in the product market. The model also contains a competitive fringe, which 
manufactures the brands whose patents have expired. In Section 3, some comparative static 
results concerning the impact of the cost and the quality of newly discovered drugs on the market 
are presented. The analysis of R&D is presented in Section 4. Some concluding remarks are 
given in Section 5. 
 
2 The Model 
Time is continuous, and is denoted by ,  ≥ 0. The model deals with the case of a single disease, 
and in the model there are  pharmaceutical firms indexed by ,  = 1,… , , where  is a positive 
integer, with  ≥ 2. Each of these firms has an active R&D program to find a new drug for 
                                                                                                                                                             
active compounds to the design of smart chemical databases and comprehensive computational infrastructures for 
interdisciplinary pharmaceutical research.  
treating the disease. There is also a competitive fringe, which produces generic drugs, using the 
technical information disclosed in the patent of a brand after the patent on the brand has expired.  
 
2.1  The R&D Process 
The elucidation of the structure of a chemical compound serves to avoid the rediscovery of a 
chemical agent that is already known for its structure and chemical activities. A chemical 
compound can be identified by its mass/charge ratio after ionization with the help of mass 
spectrometry. The technique known as nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) can be used to obtain 
information about individual atoms of a compound, which allows for a detailed reconstruction of 
the architecture of the compound. Most software used to address the chemical diversity of a 
population of compounds describe each compound in the population by its molecular fingerprint, 
which is a bit-string consisting of 0’s and 1’s that represent the answers to yes-no questions 
about the existence or absence of sub-structural features in the molecular structure of the 
compound in question.8 Molecular fingerprints typically consist of hundreds, or even thousands, 
of bits. Thus, a 1000-bit fingerprint is a point in a 1000-dimensional chemical space. The 
Tanimoto dissimilarity index, which is                 1 − ℎ			, is often 
used to express the dissimilarity, or the distance,9 between two compounds in a chemical space. 
In such a chemical space, similar compounds are expected to be located close to each other, 
while dissimilar compounds are located far apart. A much handier way to describe a compound 
is the BCUT10  approach, which represents a compound as a point in a 6-dimensional Euclidean 
space. Adopting the philosophy of the BCUT approach, we shall characterize a chemical 
compound as a point in a low-dimensional Euclidean space, and the Euclidean distance between 
two compounds in such a chemical space can then be taken as how dissimilar they are as far as 
their chemical structures are concerned.  
 
The search for a novel chemical structure to treat the disease in question is conducted among  
sources, or libraries of chemical compounds, where  is a positive integer, with  ≥ 2. For 
example, the search for a novel chemical structure might be conducted among plants (one 
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 Pearlman, op cit. 
source) or in the world of bacteria (another source). For each  = 1, … , , let  = {, , … , ,!"} 
represent the set of chemical compounds – assumed to be distinct – that are housed in the ℎ 
library, with $ being the number of compounds this library contains. Let |,& − ',&(| denote 
the Euclidean distance between two compounds ,&  and ',&( in the chemical space. If the two 
compounds are distinct, then their distance is positive, and the more dissimilar they are the 
greater will be their distance.  
 
In what follows, we shall assume that the effectiveness of a compound, say ,&, in treating the 
disease in question can be represented by an index, say ),& , that we call the quality of the 
chemical compound. The ordered pair	*,&, ),&+ will be referred to as a drug. Before a drug can 
be manufactured, investments must be made to construct a production plant. To concentrate on 
the R&D activities carried out by the firms, we choose to ignore capital investments, and simply 
assume that after a drug, say *,& , ),&+, has been discovered, any volume of the drug can be 
manufactured at a constant marginal cost, say ,,& . The list *,&, ),& , ,,&+ will be referred to as a 
brand of the drug used to treat the disease in question. Note that for two brands, say 
*,&, ),& , ,,&+ and *(,&(, )(,&(, ,(,&(+, if ,& = (,&(, then it is necessary that ),& = )(,&(  and ,,& = ,(,&(.  
 
Consider a brand, say *,&, ),&, ,,&+. Obviously, both ),& and ,,& depend on ,&. For our 
purpose, we shall assume that the location of ,& in the chemical space is known and that ,,& , 
the marginal cost of manufacturing this compound to treat the disease in question is also known. 
As far as the value of ),& is concerned, it is not known before the compound is screened, and 
thus can only be represented by a probability distribution that depends on the existing stock of 
knowledge.  
 
Conceptually, we can characterize the qualities of the chemical compounds in a library, say the ℎ source, by a cumulative distribution function on (), , … , ),!"), conditioned on 
/, , … , ,!"0. However, because of the enormous number of compounds in a chemical library, 
and because of the lack of knowledge on the potential of these compounds, it is extremely 
difficult to postulate such a distribution function for each source. Furthermore, given that a large 
number – about 5000 to be a little more specific – of compounds must be screened before a lead 
is found, we shall assume that at any point in time all the compounds in a source that have not 
been screened have the same potential in the following sense. First, within each source, the cost 
for screening a compound is the same from one compound to the next. We shall let 1 ,  =1, … , , denote the cost of screening a compound in the ℎ source. Second, within each source, 
say , the random variables ), , … , ),!"  are independently and identically distributed. These 
assumptions imply that the order in which the compounds in a source are screened is immaterial. 
Hence, we can assume that the compounds in a source are screened sequentially in the increasing 
order. Also, to concentrate on the information externalities of the R&D process, we shall ignore 
its time-consuming nature, and make the simplifying assumption that the time it takes to screen a 
compound against a target is negligible.        
 
We can model ),&,  = 1, … , ,  = 1,… ,$ , either as a continuous or a discrete random variable. 
For analytical convenience as well as for intuitive economic interpretation, we choose to model ),& as a discrete random variable. More specifically, for each  = 1,… , , the potential qualities ), , … , ),!"  are Poisson random variables with parameter 2 , i.e., their common probability 
mass function is given by 
       3[),&|2] = 6"7",8(9",8)! ;6" , ),& = 0,1, …,                                           * = 1,… , $+.                                 
 
Observe that ;6" represents the probability that a compound in source  has zero quality 
(completely ineffective in treating the disease). The Poisson process has been used by 
researchers, such as Arrow and Chang (1982), Chow (1981), Quyen (1991), and Cairns and 
Quyen (1998) to model discoveries in mineral exploration.  
 
To model learning and the information externalities generated in the search for new drugs, we 
follow Quyen (1991) and adopt the approach of Bayesian statistical decision theory. Thus, for 
each  = 1, … , , we postulate a prior density for 2 , and then revise it repeatedly via the Bayes 
formula, using the most recent data available on screening. We assume that at the beginning 2  
has a gamma distribution with parameters < and = , say 
        >?",@"[2] =  A(?")@"B" ;6"/@"2?"; , 2 > 0. 
 
In the statistical literature, the gamma density is known as a conjugate distribution of the Poisson 
process. The choice of a conjugate prior, in addition to making the computations much simpler, 
allows one to begin with a certain functional form for the prior and end up with a posterior of the 
same functional form, with the parameters updated by the sample information. Indeed, let 
        3?" ,@"[),&] = E 3[),&|2]>?",@"[2]2FG , ),& = 0,1, …,             * = 1,… ,$+.                                                                                                            
 
be the marginal density of ),&, given the parameters (< , =) that characterize the prior density of 2 . The conditional density of 2 , given ),&, is 
(1) 3[2|),&] = HB",I"J6"KL[9",8|6"]LB",I"[9",8] = M
NO"I"6"B"NPMNO"6"7",8AJ?"K@"B"J9",8K!LB",I"[9",8] 
= >?"' ,@"'[2] Γ[< + ),&] S
11 + 1/=T?"U9",8ΓJ<K=?"J),&K! 3?",@"[),&] , 
 
where >?"' ,@"'[2] is the gamma density with parameters <( = < + ), =( =   U PI".  




AJ?"K@"B"J9",8K!LB",I" [9",8] = 1 
 
Using (2) in (1), we see immediately that 3*2Z),&+ = >?"' ,@"'*2+, i.e., >?"',@"'*2+ is the posterior 
density of 2 , given ),&. Also, note that (2) can be rewritten as  
(3) 	3?",@"[),&] = A[?"U9",8]W
PPXP/I"Y
B"X7",8
AJ?"K@"B"[9",8]! , ),& = 0,1, …,               * = 1, … ,$+.                               
 which is the marginal density of ),&, given the parameters (< , =) of the prior density of 2 . The 
distribution function associated with 3?",@"[),&] is 
(4) 	[?",@"[)] = ∑ 3?",@"[)′]99'^G ,                                                        () = 0,1, … . ) 
 
The following lemma, due to Quyen (1991), gives some useful properties of [?",@"[)].  
 
LEMMA 1:  The distribution function [?",@"  is stochastically increasing in each of the parameters < and = . More precisely, for each given value of ), ) = 0,1, …, we have the following results: 
(i) For each given = , the map < → [?",@"[)] is strictly decreasing. Furthermore, ℓ?"→F[?" ,@"[)] = 0. 
(ii) For each given < , the map = → [?",@"()) is strictly decreasing. Furthermore, ℓ@"→G[?",@"[)] = 1. 
 
Before any compound in a source, say , is screened, the potential quality of a typical 
compound in this source is believed to be Poisson with parameters 2 , which in turn has a prior 
density that is gamma with parameters *< , =+. The probability mass function 3?",@"[)],  =1, … , , as represented by (3), characterizes the quality of a typical compound in . Now 
suppose that the first compound, namely , , is screened for its potential as a new drug to treat 
the disease in question, and the screening reveals that its quality is ), . The number of 
compounds in  that remain to be screened is now  − 1, and the uncertain quality of a typical 
remaining compound is believed to be Poisson with parameter 2 , which in turn is gamma with 
updated parameters <( = < + ),  and =( =   U PI".  In particular, the probability mass function 
that characterizes the quality of a typical remaining compound is 3?"' ,@"'[),&],  = 2,… ,$ . Note 
that the higher is the revealed quality of the compound ,  after it has been screened against the 
target, the more optimistic our beliefs will be concerning the potential of a typical remaining 
compound in source . If  compounds in  have been screened and the qualities of these 
compounds have been revealed as ), , … , ),&, then the potential quality of a typical remaining 
compound is embodied in the distribution function [?"'[&],@"'[&][)], where we have let <([1] =< , =([1] = = , and for each a = 1,… , , we have let <([a + 1] = <([a] + ),b , 	=([a + 1] =1/(1 + 1/=([a]). In view of Lemma 1.(i), the higher is the sum ), +⋯+ ),& of the revealed 
qualities, the more favourable will be the potential quality of a typical remaining compound, and 
this is economically quite intuitive: the more successful is the search for a new drug in a 
chemical library, the higher will be the potential quality of a typical remaining compound in this 
chemical library.  
 
At the beginning, if we interpret < and  @", respectively, as the cumulative quality revealed and 
the number of compounds screened in the past, then <([] and 1/=([] represent, respectively, 
the cumulative revealed quality and the number of compounds that have been screened – past 
and present – after  more compounds have been screened. The list 
*(, , ), , ,, +, … , (,& , ),&, ,,&)) represents the history of the search in , and the ordered 
pair *<([], =([]+ embodies all the learning from the R&D activities of all the firms in the 
industry if the information generated in their search programs is pooled.    
 
2.2  Patent Breadth 
As far as the granting of a patent is concerned, how novel a new drug is obviously depends on its 
distance from the patented brand in the chemical space. Furthermore, it is also reasonable to 
consider a new drug as not infringing on a patented brand if it comes from a source that is 
different from the source from which the patented brand is manufactured. Pig insulin, cow 
insulin, and human insulin produced by bacteria are all various brands of insulin used to treat 
diabetics. Insulin can be produced from plants11 or fungi.12 Recently, Symbiosis,13 a Calgary-
based company, claimed to have developed a technology for producing insulin from the 
safflower at a cost of 40% lower than that of traditional processes, and that the insulin produced 
                                                 
11
“Commercial Production of Insulin and Insulin-lke Proteins in Plants,” United States Patent 7393998.  
12
 “Process for the Production of Insulin by Genetically Transformed Fungal Cells,” United States Patent 408 2613.  
13
 http://www.DefeatDiabetes.org. 
from the safflower is virtually indistinguishable from human insulin. Insulin produced from the 
safflower thus does not infringe on the patent on human insulin produced by bacteria according 
to the recombinant DNA technology. Thus, for patent purposes, the distance – or novelty – 
between two brands, say (,& , ),&, ,,&) and *(,&(, )(,&(, ,',&(+, can be defined in the following 
manner 
(5)      /*,&, ),&, ,,&+, *',&' , )' ,&' , ,',&'+0 
																											= d Z, − ',&'Z + deZ),& − )',&'Z + dfZ,,& − ,',&'Z + g' , 
 
where d , de, df are positive parameters strictly smaller than 1, and g( = 1 if  ≠ ′, g( = 0 if  = (. Note that the distance between two brands, as defined by (5) is a weighted sum of (i) their 
distance in the chemical space, (ii) their quality differential, (iii) their cost differential, and (iv) g( a distance between two sources, with the distance being assigned the value 1 if they are 
distinct and the value 0 if they are the same. Note that the distance defined by (5) captures both 
product innovation – the first, second, and fourth term on the right-hand side of (5) – and process 
innovation – the third term on the right-hand side of (5).   
 
Using the distance between two brands, as represented by (5), we can define the breadth – or 
more precisely, the leading breadth – of a patent as a number          i, 0 < i < 1, such that a new 
brand, say *(,&(, )(,&(, ,',&(+, is judged not to infringe on a patented brand, say		*,&, ),&, ,,&+, 
if )(,&( ≥ ),& and  /*,&, ),&, ,,&+, *(,&(, )(,&(, ,',&(+0 > i. In the literature on patent design, 
another concept of patent breadth – lagging breadth – is also proposed. The difference between 
the two concepts of breadth is that the leading breadth protects the patented product from the 
competition by superior products, while the lagging breadth protects the patented product from 
the competition by inferior products. An immediate implication of the adoption of a leading 
breadth is that the quality of the most recently patented brand rises through time. For a more 
detailed analysis of these two concepts of patent breadth, the reader can consult O’Donoghue et 
al., op cit. 
 
We have characterized a brand as a list *,&, ),&, ,,&+, which describes, respectively, its location 
in the chemical space, its quality in treating the disease in question, and its marginal cost (the 
cost of manufacturing one unit of this chemical compound). For economic considerations, it is 
also necessary to add another dimension to the characterization of a brand: the date on which the 
brand is patented. Thus, we shall from now on represent a brand by a list, 
k = *,&, ),&, ,,&, l,&+, where l,& is the date on which the brand is patented. Also, we let m 
denote the length of a patent. 
 
2.3  Preferences 
For each  ≥ 0, let Ω[] denote the set of brands that are available on the market at time . The 
set Ω[] consists of the brands whose patents have expired and are now manufactured by the 
fringe as well as the brands whose patents are still in force. In what follows, we shall denote by Ω;[] the totality of brands whose patents have expired by time . Because a generic drug must 
compete against the leading brands and against the other generic drugs, not all the brands whose 
patents have expired will be marketed by the fringe. Thus, only those brands in Ω;[] with a 
sufficiently low production cost and a sufficiently high quality will be marketed by the fringe. 
However, without any loss of generality we can assume that Ω;[] is a subset of Ω[] by 
interpreting an element of Ω;[] that is not marketed as a generic drug that the fringe is willing 
to supply, but there is no demand for it due to its high price or low quality. Note that the set Ω;[] gets larger with time as more and more brands whose patents have expired are added to it. 
 
The representative consumer consumes a numéraire good and various brands of the drug 
available on the market, and her preferences are represented by the following Cobb-Douglas 
utility function:  
(6)     o*G, (p)pqr[s]+ = G ;t*∑ uvH[9",8wxU ]xyz[{] +t . 
 
In (6), 0 < | < 1, is a parameter, G is the consumption of the numéraire good, and p is the 
consumption of the brand k = (,&, ),&, ,,& , l,&)dΩ[].  
 
The representative consumer chooses the consumption bundle *G, (p)pqr[s]+ that maximizes 
(6) subject to the following budget constraint: 
 (7)     G + ∑ }pppqr[s] = []. 
 
In (7), }p denotes the price of the brand k.  
 
If we interpret the quality of a drug as its therapeutic contents, then p = ),&p represents the 
effective consumption of the brand k. Let }p = }p/),& and ,,& = ,,&/),& denote, 
respectively, the price and the marginal cost – normalized by its own quality – of the brand k. As 
defined, }p and ,,& represent, respectively, the price and the marginal cost of effective 
consumption. In what follows, we will simply refer to }p and ,,& as the effective price and the 
effective marginal cost of the brand k, respectively. Adopting the interpretation of quality as the 
therapeutic contents of a drug, we can restate the problem faced by the representative consumer 
under the following simpler form: 
(8)     /w~,*wx+xyz[{]0G ;t*∑ uvH[wxU ]xyz[{] +t  
subject to 
(9)     G + ∑ }pppqr[s] = []. 
 
This is a simple utility maximization problem whose solution is given by 
(10)     p = t ;tUt|r[s]| []U∑ x''z[{]x − 1 
                      = t ;tUt|r[s]| S[]U∑ x''(z[{]N)x + 1T − 1 
                           = t ;tUt|r[s]| S[]U∑ x''(z[{]N)x T − /1 − t ;tUt|r[s]|0 
                                  = t ;tUt|r[s]| S[]U∑ x''(z[{]N)x T −  ;etUt|r[s]| ;tUt|r[s]|    
                                      = Px[]x − G,                                  (kd[]).                                                   
 
where |Ω[t]| denotes the number of elements of Ω[t], and  
(11)    p[] = [] + ∑ }p('(r[s];) , 
(12)    G =  ;eUt|r[s]| ;tUt|r[s]| ,  = t ;tUt|r[s]|. 
                                                                                                         
3 The Prices of Drugs 
In practice, a pharmaceutical firm might market several brands of the drug at any time. However, 
to keep the exposition from becoming overburdened with notations, we shall make the 
simplifying assumption that if a pharmaceutical firm chooses to market a certain brand of the 
drug that it has patented, then it will market this brand exclusively during the statutory life of the 
patent on this brand. Because once the patent on a brand has expired, it will be marketed as a 
generic drug by the competitive fringe at cost, the firm that held the patent on the brand will not 
make any profit by continuing to market this brand. Thus, we shall assume that when this 
happens, the firm will stop marketing the brand, and must search for a new brand of the drug if it 
wishes to stay in the market. For the brands whose patents have not yet expired, their prices will 
be strategically set by the holders of these patents. To study the strategic behaviour of these 
firms, we shall consider the simple case in which the set of brands whose patents have not yet 
expired at time  consists of only two brands, say k′ = ((,&(, )(,&(, ,(,&(, l(,&() and k′′ =(((,&((, )((,&((, ,((,&((, l((,&((), and that these two brands are held by two different firms. 
Analyzing the case of more than two pharmaceutical firms that are active in the search for a new 
drug will force us to consider the numerous combinations of dates on which the drugs discovered 
by these firms are patented. While this adds more realism to the model, it does not yield any 
more insights into the R&D process.   Also, for simplicity we consider in this section the simple 
case of a single generic drug, say k = *,& , ),&, ,,& , l,&+, which is manufactured and sold by 
the fringe at production cost, i.e.,  }p = ,,& . The generalization to the case of more than one 
generic drug on the market can be made in a straightforward manner. 
 
Let }p( (}p((, }. ) denote the effective price of the brand k′ (k′′, }. ) set at time  by the 
firm which holds the patent on this brand. The profit earned at time  by the brand k′ is  
(13)    (}p( 	− c' ,&') S x'[]x' 	 − GT. 
 
Maximization of (13) with respect to }p( we obtain the following reaction function for the firm 
that holds the patent on the brand k(: 
(14)    p(:	}p(( → }p( = √P[]Ux''U",8"',8'~ . 
 
Note that p( is strictly increasing and strictly concave, and that its slope tends to 0 when }p(( → ∞.  
 
Similarly, we obtain the following reaction function for the firm that holds the patent on the 
brand k((:  
(15)    p((:		}p( → }p(( = √P[]Ux'U",8'',8''~ . 
 
Like the reaction curve p(, the reaction curve p(( is also strictly increasing, strictly concave, 
and its slope (with respect to the  }p( price axis) approaches 0 when }p( → ∞. The reaction 
curves of the two firms are depicted in Figure 6. 
 
 Figure 6. The equilibrium effective prices of drugs 
 
The two reaction curves intersect at a unique point, which is depicted as point  in Figure 6 and 
which represents the effective prices set by the two firms under the equilibrium at each instant.  
 
An alternative – and more effective – way for finding the equilibrium prices and for carrying out 
comparative static exercises is through the two composite maps 
(16)    Φp(: }p( → k′[k′′[}k′]] =  κ0 √κ1c',&'[] + c,& + κ1[]Ux'U",8"'',8''κ0 , 
and  
(17)    Φp((: }p(( → p(( p'J}p''K =  ~√κ c′′,′′[] + c, + √P[]Ux''Uc,c′,′~ . 
 
The curve depicting the composite map Φp( is depicted in Figure 7. It begins at }p( = 0 above 
the 45-degree line. It is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and its slope approaches 0 when 
fw' :pw''->fw'@ pw''D




}p( → ∞. Hence the curve crosses the 45-degree line at a unique point, which represents the 
equilibrium effective price of the brand k(. In the same manner, the unique fixed point of the 
composite map Φp(( represents the equilibrium effective price of the brand k((.  
 
Figure 7. The composite map ′J′K = ′[′′[′]] 
 
 
In what follows, the market share of a brand is defined as the revenue it earns relative to the total 
revenues earned by the industry. The following proposition gives the comparative static results 
of a variation in the effective marginal cost of a brand marketed by a firm that holds the patent 
on this brand. 
45-degree line
E Fw' @ pw'D
pw'
Fw' @ pw 'D
  
PROPOSITION 1: For a brand whose patent has not expired, the higher is its effective marginal 
cost, 
(i) the higher will be its effective price, the lower will be its market share, and the lower will be the 
profits it earns; 
(ii) the higher will be the effective price, the market share, and the profits of the rival brand; 
(iii) the higher will be the total revenues and market share of generic drugs.     
         
PROOF: The proof of Proposition 1 is given in Annex A. 
 
The following proposition describes how the quality and the prices of generic drugs influence the 
pricing behaviour of the firms that hold the patents currently in force. 
 
PROPOSITION 2: The higher is the effective cost of the generic drugs,  
(i) the lower will be their revenues and their market share; 
(ii) the higher will be the effective price, the output, the market share, and the profits of each of 
the brands whose patents has not expired.      
 
PROOF: The proof of Proposition 2 is given in Annex B. 
 
In what follows, we shall let p([, [], k(, k((, Ω;[]] and p(([,[], k(, k((, Ω;[]] denote 
the profit earned at time  by the brand k′ and the brand k((, respectively.  
 
4 R&D and Information Externalities  
In this section, as in Section 3.3, we shall assume that in the industry there are two firms each of 
which has an active drug discovery program and a competitive fringe, which markets the brands 
whose patents have expired as generic drugs. Also, we shall assume that the income of the 
representative consumer is not varying over time; that is, [] =  = ,.  
 In a drug discovery program, a pharmaceutical firm has to decide which compound in which 
chemical library to screen as well as the timing of the screening. To concentrate on the 
information generated in the R&D activities of the pharmaceutical firms and to keep the model 
from becoming too complex, we shall eschew the modeling of the timing of the screenings as a 
strategic decision variable, and shall make two simplifying assumptions on R&D. First, a 
pharmaceutical firm with an active drug discovery program will only screen a chemical 
compound to find a new drug when the patent on the brand it currently markets expires. Second, 
if a pharmaceutical firm chooses not to carry out any screening when the patent on the brand it 
currently markets expires, it will terminate all R&D activities and exit the market. With these 
simplifying assumptions, the only strategic decision a pharmaceutical firm needs to consider is 
the chemical library and the compound in that chemical library to concentrate its efforts on. To 
study the evolution of technological progress in the pharmaceutical industry, we try to find the 
sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the dynamic game played by the firms in this industry. 
The sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium is found by backward induction on the set of chemical 
compounds not yet screened.  
 
If all the compounds in all the chemical libraries have been screened, there is nothing left to 
discuss as far R&D is concerned, and all that needs to be done is to analyze the strategic 
behaviour in the product market of the holders of the patents on the brands which have not yet 
expired. This task was carried out in Section 3.3. So, we begin the backward induction with the 
case in which the set of chemical compounds that have not been screened contains only one 
element.  
 
4.1  One Remaining Unscreened Chemical Compound 
Suppose that among all the chemical libraries there remains only a compound that has not been 
screened, say the compound (,!" , ),!" , ,,!"), which is the last compound in the ℎ chemical 
library. Also, suppose that the information obtained from the past screenings in this chemical 
library leads us to believe that the potential quality of this chemical compound is represented by 
the probability mass function 3*?"J!"K,@"J!"K+[),!"]. 
 Let k′ = ((,&(, )(,&(, ,(,&(, l(,&() and k(( = (((,&((, )((,&((, ,((,&((, l((,&(() be the two brands 
currently marketed by the two pharmaceutical firms that hold the patents on these brands. 
Without any loss of generality, we assume that l(( < l(. That is, the patent on the brand k′′ was 
granted before that on the brand k(, and thus the patent on the former brand will expire before 
the patent on the latter brand. According to the assumption that a pharmaceutical firm will only 
carry out the screenings needed to find a new drug when the patent it holds on the brand it 
currently markets expires, the last chemical compound will be screened by the firm which holds 
the patent on the brand k′′ if this firm finds the screening to be profitable.  
 
If the pharmaceutical firm which holds the patent on the brand k′′ chooses to screen the last 
compound, then the newly discovered drug can only be patented if its quality is at least equal to 
the quality of the brand that is most recently patented, namely the brand k(, and if its distance 
from k′ is greater than the breadth that protects the brand k(; that is, if ),!"  belongs to the set 
(18) ,!"[k′] =  ),!"¡),!" ≥ )(,&(,  /((,&(, )(,&(, ,(,&(), (,! , ),!" , ,,!")0 > i¢.    
 
In this case, the discounted value – discounted to the time the patent on the brand k′′ expires – of 
the stream of profits earned by the newly discovered drug is given by 
 
(19)    £ [),!"] = E ;¤/¥;¦"'',8'';u0pNJ,,k;, k(, Ω;[]K¦"',8'Uu¦"'',8''Uu  
																											+§ ;¤(¥;¦"'',8'';u)pNJ,,k;, Ω;[]K¦"'',8''Ueu¦"',8'Uu . 
 
In (19),  is the market rate of interest, and k; = /,!" , ),!" , ,,!" , l,!"0 represents the newly 
discovered drug, with l,!" = l((,&(( + m as the date on which the last compound is screened, 
which is also the date on which the newly discovered drug is patented. Also, Ω;[], we recall, 
represents the set of brands whose patents have expired by time .  
 
The first integral in (19) represents the discounted value of the stream of profits earned by the 
newly discovered drug from the time of its discovery until the time the patent on the brand k′ 
expires. During the time interval Jl'' ,&'' + m, l',&' + m+, the newly discovered drug has to 
compete against the brand k′ marketed by the rival pharmaceutical firm which holds the patent 
on this brand as well as against all the generic drugs – which include its own predecessor (the 
brand k(() and all the brands whose patents expired by time l'' ,&(( + m. Under the integral sign, 
the expression pNJ,,k;, k(, Ω;[]K represents the profit earned by the newly discovered 
drug at each time  during the time interval Jl'',&'' + m, l',&' + m+. According to Proposition 1, pNJ,,k;, k(, Ω;[]K is strictly increasing (decreasing) in the marginal cost (quality) of the 
rival brand k(. According to Proposition 2, pNJ,,k;, k(, Ω;[]K is strictly decreasing 
(increasing) in the quality (marginal cost) of each generic drug.  
The second integral in (19) represents the discounted value of the stream of profits earned by the 
newly discovered drug from time l',&' + m until the end of its statutory life. During this time 
interval, the newly discovered drug only faces competition from the generic drugs, which include 
the brand k′ whose patent expired at time l',&' + m. The expression pNJ,,k;, Ω;[]K under 
the integral sign represents the profit earned by the newly discovered drug at each time  during 
the time interval Jl(,&( + m, l((,&(( + 2m+. Note that pNJ,, k;, Ω;[]K is strictly decreasing 
(increasing) in the quality (marginal cost) of each generic drug.  
 
According to Proposition 1, £ [),!"] is strictly increasing in ),!" . It is also higher if the quality 
(marginal cost) of the brand k′ is lower (higher). According to Proposition 2, £ [),!"] is higher 
if qualities (marginal costs) of the generic drugs are lower (higher). 
 
Under the event that the screening of the compound (,!" , ),!" , ,,!") does not yield any 
patentable drug, the firm that holds the patent on the brand k′′ incurred the R&D cost 1  without 
obtaining any benefits.  
 
The discounted value of the stream of profits earned by the firm which holds the patent on the 
brand k′′ if it chooses to screen the last compound when this patent expires – as a function of the 
quality of this compound – is then given by 
(20)    £e[),!"] = ¨£ [),!"]	3	),!" ∈ ,!"[k′],0, ℎª. « 
 
From the discussion on the properties of £ [),!"], we can assert that £e[),!"] is increasing 
(decreasing) in ),!" 	*,,&+. It is decreasing (increasing) in the qualities (marginal costs) of all the 
other brands – those whose patents have expired and those whose patents have not expired. The 
expected discounted profit net of R&D costs – with the discounting being carried back to the 
time the patent on the brand k′′  expires – that the firm which holds this patent obtains from by 
screening the last compound is then given by 




 ®p(( k(, k((, Ω;[l'',&'' + m] ¯/,!" , ),!" , ,,!"0 , 3(?"[!"],@"[!"])[),!"]« = 	{0, £f}. 
 
denote the expected discounted payoff net of R&D cost – discounted to the time the patent on the 
brand k′′ expires – that the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′′ obtains, given that (i) 
the patent on the brand k′′ was granted before the patent on the rival brand k(, and (ii) the 
probability mass function which characterizes the quality of the last compound is 3*?"J!"K,@"J!"K+[),!"].  
 
PROPOSITION 3: The firm which holds the patent on the brand k′′ only chooses to screen the last 
compound when the patent it holds on the brand k′′ expires if £f > 0, i.e., if the expected 
discounted payoff net of R&D costs yielded by this action is positive. Furthermore, if this is the 
case, then the expected discounted payoff net of R&D costs obtained by this firm is 
 
 
(i) decreasing in 1 , the cost of screening; 
(ii) increasing in <J$K, the cumulative quality discovered in the past screenings of the 
compounds in the ℎ chemical library, and decreasing in  @"J!"K, the number of past 
screenings carried out in this chemical library;  
(iii) decreasing in the marginal cost of the drug manufactured from the last compound. 
(iv) decreasing (increasing) in the qualities (marginal costs) of all the other brands – generic 
drugs as well as the brands whose patents have not expired.  
 
PROOF: The proof of Proposition 3 is given in Annex C. 
 
LEMMA 2: If the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′′ chooses not to screen the last 
compound when the patent it holds on the brand k′′ expires, then neither will the firm which 
holds the patent on the rival brand k′ choose to screen the last compound when this patent 
expires. 
 
PROOF: The proof of Lemma 2 is given in Annex D. 
        
Now let 
(23)    ®p( k(, k((, Ω;[l'',&'' + m] ¯/,!" , ),!" , ,,!"0 , 3(?"[!"],@"[!"])[),!"]« 
 
denote the expected discounted payoff – discounted to the time the patent on the brand k′′ 
expires – that the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′ obtains, given that (i) the patent on 
the brand k′′ was granted before the patent on the rival brand k(, and (ii) the probability mass 
function which characterizes the quality of the last compound is 3*?"J!"K,@"J!"K+[),!"]. This 
expected discounted payoff can be computed as follows. 
 
If the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′′ chooses to screen the last compound and 
obtains a patentable drug k; from the screening, then the discounted value – discounted to the 
time the patent on the brand k′′ expires – of the stream of profits earned by the brand k′ from 
time l((,&(( + m until the end of its statutory life is  
(24)    £°[),!"] = E ;¤/¥;¦"'',8'';u0p(J,,k;, k(, Ω;[]K¦"',8'Uu¦"'',8''Uu . 
 
On the other hand, under the event that the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′′ fails to 
obtain a patentable drug from screening the last compound, the discounted value – discounted to 
the time the patent on the brand k′′ expires – of the stream of profits earned by the brand k′ 
from time l((,&(( + m until the end of its statutory life is  
(25)    £± = E ;¤/¥;¦"'',8'';u0p(J,,k(, Ω;[]K¦"',8'Uu¦"'',8''Uu . 
 
Thus, if the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′′ chooses to screen the last chemical 
compound when the patent on the brand k′′ expires, then the expected discounted value of the 
stream of profits earned by the brand k′ from time l((,&(( + m until the end of its statutory life – 
with the discounting being carried back to the time the patent on the brand k′′ expires – is given 
by 
(26)    £² = ∑ 	£°[),!"]3*?"J!"K,@"J!"K+ ),!"9",¬"∈³",¬"[p']  
                                       +£± /1 − ∑ 3(?"[!"],@"[!"])[),!"]9",¬"q³",¬"[p(] 0. 
 
If the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′′ chooses not to screen the last chemical 
compound, then according to Lemma 2, the last compound will not be screened by the firm 
which holds the patent on the brand k( either, when the patent on the brand k(	expires. Under 
this scenario, the expected discounted value – discounted to the time the patent on the brand k′′ 
expires – of the stream of profits earned by the brand k′ is also given by £±.  
 
We are now ready to give the explicit expression for (23) as follows: 
(27)   ®p( k(, k((, Ω;[l'',&'' + m] ¯/,!" , ),!" , ,,!"0 , 3(?"[!"],@"[!"])[),!"]« = 
¨ £²	3	ℎ	3	ªℎ,ℎ	ℎ	ℎ	}		ℎ	´	k((,	ℎ		,}o,£±	3		ℎ	3	ªℎ,ℎ	ℎ	ℎ	}		ℎ	´	k((		,	ℎ		,}o.« 
  
PROPOSITION 4: The expected discounted payoff – discounted to the time the patent on the brand k′′ expires – that is earned by the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′ from time l'' ,&(( + m until the end of the statutory life of the patent on the brand k′ is 
(i) decreasing in <J$K, the cumulative quality discovered in the ℎ chemical library, and 
increasing in  @"J!"K, the number of past screenings in the ℎ chemical library; 
(ii) increasing (decreasing) in the quality (marginal cost) of the brand k′   
(iii) decreasing (increasing) in the qualities (marginal costs) of the generic drugs as well as the 
brands whose patents have not expired. 
 
PROOF: The proof of Proposition 4 is given in Annex E. 
 
4.2  Two Remaining Unscreened Chemical Compounds  
Let k′ = ((,&(, )(,&(, ,(,&(, l(,&() and k(( = (((,&((, )((,&((, ,((,&((, l((,&((), with l(( < l(, be the 
two brands currently marketed by the two pharmaceutical firms which hold the patents on these 
brands.  Suppose that there remain only two chemical compounds that have not been screened, 
say *[ℓ],&[ℓ], )[ℓ],&[ℓ], ,[ℓ],&[ℓ]+, ℓ = 1,2. There are two possibilities to consider: (i) the two 
compounds are located in two different chemical libraries, and (ii) the two compounds are 
located in the same chemical library. Under the first possibility, screening one compound yields 
only information about this compound, but no information about the other compound. Under the 
second possibility,  screening the penultimate compound yields information about this compound 
and information about the last compound.  
 
4.2.1 The Two Chemical Compounds are Located in Two Different Chemical Libraries 
Suppose that the last two compounds that have not been screened are located in two different 
chemical libraries. Under this scenario, each compound is the last one in a chemical library, i.e.,  
        
*[ℓ],&[ℓ], )[ℓ],&[ℓ], ,[ℓ],&[ℓ]+ = /[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , )[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , ,[ℓ],!"[ℓ]0,             (ℓ = 1,2), 
 
with [1] ≠ [2]. Also, suppose that the qualities of these compounds are characterized by the 
probability mass functions 3*?"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K,@"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K+[)[ℓ],!"[ℓ]], ℓ = 1,2.  
 
For each ℓ = 1,2, let 
(28)	£µℓ = ®p(( k(, k((, Ω;Jl'',&(( + mK ¡([ℓ],!"[ℓ] , )[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , ,[ℓ],!"[ℓ]),« 3*?"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K,@"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K+[)[ℓ],!"[ℓ]]   
 
denote the expected discounted payoff net of R&D costs that the firm which holds the patent on 
the brand k′′ obtains under the assumption that ([ℓ],!"[ℓ] , )[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , ,[ℓ],!"[ℓ]) stands alone as the 
single remaining compound, not as one of the two remaining compounds.     
 
LEMMA 3:  
(i) If £µℓ ≤ 0, ℓ = 1,2, i.e., if neither compound is screened by the firm which holds the patent on 
the brand k′′ when it stands alone as the single remaining compound, then it will not be 
screened, either, by this firm when it is one of the two remaining compounds. The same result 
holds for the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′ when this patent expires. 
(ii) If £µℓ > 0, £µℓ( ≤ 0, then the compound ([ℓ],!"[ℓ] , )[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , ,[ℓ],!"[ℓ]) will be screened by the 
firm which holds the patent on the brand k′′ when this patent expires. Furthermore, 
regardless of the outcome of the screening, the compound (Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K , )Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K , ,Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K) 
will not be screened by the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′ when this patent 
expires. 
 
PROOF: The proof of Lemma 3 is given in Annex F. 
 
If £µℓ > 0, ℓ = 1,2, then neither compound can be summarily rejected, and the question 
concerning the order in which the compounds are screened arises.  
Suppose that the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′′ chooses to screen the compound 
/[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , )[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , ,[ℓ],!"[ℓ]0 immediately after the patent on the brand k′′ has expired. Under 
the event that the screening leads to a patentable drug, i.e., if )[ℓ],!"[ℓ] ∈ [ℓ],!"[ℓ][k(], where  
(29)    [ℓ],!"[ℓ][k(] = 
																	 )[ℓ],!"[ℓ]¡)[ℓ],!"[ℓ] ≥ )(,&(, (((,&(, )(,&(, ,(,&(), ([ℓ],!"[ℓ] , )[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , ,[ℓ],!"[ℓ])) > i¢, 
 
then the discounted value – discounted to time the patent on the brand k′′ expires – of the stream 
of profits earned by the newly discovered drug during the time interval [l'',&'' + m, l',&' + m) is 
given by 
(30)    £·ℓ )[ℓ],!"[ℓ] = E ;¤*¥;¦"'',8'';u+pℓ ,,kℓ, k(, Ω;[] ¦"',8'Uu¦"'',8''Uu , 
 
where kℓ = /[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , )[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , ,[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , l[ℓ],!"[ℓ]0, with l[ℓ],!"[ℓ] = l((,&(( + m, denotes the 
newly discovered drug. Furthermore, at time l(,&( + m, when the patent on the brand k′ expires, 
the two pharmaceutical firms find themselves exactly in the situation analyzed in Sub-section 
3.4.1, but with their roles reversed. Now there is only one compound left for screening, namely 
the compound SJℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K , )Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K , ,Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'KT , ℓ( ≠ ℓ, and the two brands marketed by the 
two pharmaceutical firms are kℓ and k(, with the patent on the latter brand being granted before 
the patent on the former brand. Under such a scenario, the expected discounted payoff – 
discounted to the time the patent on the brand k′ expires – earned by the firm which holds the 
patent on the brand kℓ after the patent on the brand k′ has expired is given by 
(31)						£ℓ¸[)[ℓ],!"[ℓ]] =  
®pℓ ¹kℓ, k(, Ω;[l',&' + m] º(Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K , )Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K , ,Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K),« 3/?"Jℓ'K!"Jℓ'K,@"Jℓ'K!"Jℓ'K0[)Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K]». 
 
The discounted payoff – discounted to the time the patent on the brand k′′ expires – earned by 
the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′′ under the event that the screening of the 
compound ([ℓ],!"[ℓ] , )[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , ,[ℓ],!"[ℓ]) results in a patentable drug is then given by 
(32)    £ Gℓ [)[ℓ],!"[ℓ]] = £·ℓ[)[ℓ],!"[ℓ]] + ;¤(¦"',8';¦"'',8'')£ℓ¸[)[ℓ],!"[ℓ]]. 
 On the other hand, if the screening of the compound ([ℓ],!"[ℓ] , )[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , ,[ℓ],!"[ℓ])  is not fruitful, 
then the two firms also find themselves in the same situation analyzed in Sub-section 3.4.1, with (Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K , )Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K , ,Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K) being the last remaining chemical compound. The expected 
discounted payoff – discounted to the instant the patent on the brand k′′ expires – that this firm 
earns after the first unsuccessful attempt is £µℓ(, according to (28). 
 
If the first screening was not fruitful, and if £µℓ( > 0, then there will be a surge in R&D activities: 
the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′′ will continue the search by screening 
immediately the remaining compound, namely the compound (Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K , )Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K , ,Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K). 
Under this scenario, £µℓ( represents the discounted payoff net of R&D cost – discounted to the 
time the patent on the brand k′′ expires – that is yielded by the second screening. 
 
The expected discounted payoff net of R&D costs – discounted to the time the patent on the 
brand k′′ expires – that the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′′ obtains by screening the 
compound ([ℓ],!"[ℓ] , )[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , ,[ℓ],!"[ℓ]) is given by  
(33)   £  ℓ = −1[ℓ] + ∑ £ Gℓ [)[ℓ],!"[ℓ]]3*?"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K,@"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K+[)[ℓ],!"[ℓ]]9"[ℓ],¬"[ℓ]∈³"[ℓ],¬"[ℓ][p']  
     +£µℓ( S1 − ∑ 3*?"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K,@"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K+[)[ℓ],!"[ℓ]]9"[ℓ],¬"[ℓ]∈³"[ℓ],¬"[ℓ][p'] T. 
 
Obviously, if £  ℓ ≤ 0, then the ℓℎ remaining compound will not be screened by the firm which 
holds the patent on the brand k′′ when this patent expires. In particular, if A  ℓ ≤ 0, for each ℓ = 1,2, then the firm which holds the patent on the brand ω′′ will shut down its R&D activities 
and exit the market after the patent on the brand ω′′ has expired.  
 
When both £  ℓ  and £  ℓ(  are positive, it is necessary to compare them in order to find out which 
compound should be screened first. Because of the numerous parameters involved – the dates on 
which the patents on the brands k′ and k′′ were granted; the screening costs of the two 
remaining unscreened compounds; the potential qualities of these compounds; and the marginal 
costs of the drugs manufactured from these compounds – it is difficult to determine 
unambiguously the sign of the payoff differential £  ℓ − £  ℓ( . Intuitively, we expect that the order 
of screening should favours the compound with lower screening cost and higher potential 
quality. It should also favour the compound from which a drug with a lower marginal cost could 
be discovered. The following proposition confirms our intuition of the influence of screening 
costs on the order of screening.    
        
PROPOSITION 5: Suppose that £  ℓ > 0, ℓ = 1,2. Then, every other thing equal, the compound 
with the lower screening cost should be screened first.     
 
PROOF: The proof of Proposition 5 is given in Annex G. 
 
PROPOSITION 6: Suppose that £  ℓ > 0, ℓ = 1,2. Every other thing equal, the compound from 
which a new drug with much higher marginal cost is manufactured should not be screened first.     
 
PROOF: The proof of Proposition 6 is given in Annex H. 
 
PROPOSITION 7: Suppose that £  ℓ > 0, ℓ = 1,2. Then every other thing equal, the compound 
with the potential quality that is stochastically much larger should be screened first.     
 
PROOF: The proof of Proposition 7 is given in Annex I. 
 
Let 
(34)  ®p'' ¹k(, k((, Ω;[l'' ,&'' + m] º/([ℓ],!"[ℓ] , )[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , ,[ℓ],!"[ℓ]), 3*?"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K,@"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K+[)[ℓ],!"[ℓ]]0ℓ^ e «»    
                   =   0, *£  ℓ +ℓ^ e ¢ 
 
denote the expected discounted payoff for the firm which holds the patent on the brand k((, given 
that (i) the patent on the brand k′′ was granted before the patent on the brand k(, (ii) there are 
two remaining unscreened compounds, /([ℓ],!"[ℓ] , )[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , ,[ℓ],!"[ℓ])0ℓ^ e , which are located in 
two different chemical libraries, and (iii) for each ℓ = 1,2, the potential quality of the remaining 





(35) ®p' ¹k(, k((, Ω;[l'',&'' + m] º/([ℓ],!"[ℓ] , )[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , ,[ℓ],!"[ℓ]), 3*?"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K,@"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K+[)[ℓ],!"[ℓ]]0ℓ^ e «» 
 
denote the expected discounted payoff – discounted to the time the patent on the brand k′′ 
expires – for the firm which holds the patent on the brand k(, given that (i) the patent on the 
brand k′′ was granted before the patent on the brand k(, (ii) there are two remaining unscreened 
compounds, /([ℓ],!"[ℓ] , )[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , ,[ℓ],!"[ℓ])0ℓ^ e , which are located in two different chemical 
libraries, and (iii) for each ℓ = 1,2, the potential quality of the remaining unscreened compound ℓ is represented by the probability mass function 3*?"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K,@"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K+[)[ℓ],!"[ℓ]]. This expected 
discounted payoff can be computed as follows. 
 
First, if the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′′ chooses to screen the compound 
/[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , )[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , ,[ℓ],!"[ℓ]0 immediately after the patent on the brand k′′ has expired, and if 
the screening results in a patentable drug kℓ = ([ℓ],!"[ℓ] , )[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , ,[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , l[ℓ],!"[ℓ]), with l[ℓ],!"[ℓ] = l((,&(( + m, then the expected discounted payoff – discounted to the time the patent on 
the brand k′′ expires – for the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′ is given by 
(36)		£ eℓ [)[ℓ],!"[ℓ]] =
E ;¤/¥;¦"'',8'';u0p' ,,kℓ, k(, Ω;[] ¦"',8'Uu¦"'',8''Uu + ;¤(¦"',8';¦"'',8'') ×	®p( 	kℓ, k(, Ω;[l',&' +
m] ¡([ℓ(],!"[ℓ'] , )[ℓ(],!"[ℓ'] , ,[ℓ(],!"[ℓ']),« 3*?"[ℓ']J!"[ℓ']K,@"[ℓ']J!"[ℓ']K+[)[ℓ(],!"[ℓ']].  
 
In (44), Ω;Jl',&' + mK = Ω;[l'',&'' + m]⋃{k′}.  
 
If the screening of the compound /[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , )[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , ,[ℓ],!"[ℓ]0 is not fruitful, then immediately 
after this screening, we have the situation analyzed in Sub-section 3.4.1, and the expected 
discounted payoff – discounted to the time the patent on the brand k′′ expires – for the firm 
which holds the patent on the brand k′ is given by 
(37)			£ fℓ( =
®p( 	k(, k((, Ω;[l'',&'' + m] ¡([ℓ(],!"[ℓ'] , )[ℓ(],!"[ℓ'] , ,[ℓ(],!"[ℓ']),« 3*?"[ℓ']J!"[ℓ']K,@"[ℓ']J!"[ℓ']K+[)[ℓ(],!"[ℓ']].  
 
Thus, under the scenario that the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′′ chooses to screen 
the compound /[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , )[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , ,[ℓ],!"[ℓ]0 immediately after the patent on the brand k′′ has 
expired, then the expected discounted payoff – discounted to the time the patent on the brand k′′ 
expires – for the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′ is given by 
(38)    £ °ℓ = ∑ £ eℓ [)[ℓ],!"[ℓ]]3*?"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K,@"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K+[)[ℓ],!"[ℓ]]9"[ℓ],¬"[ℓ]∈³"[ℓ],¬"[ℓ][p']  
                    					+ S(1 − ∑ 3*?"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K,@"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K+[)[ℓ],!"[ℓ]])9"[ℓ],¬"[ℓ]∈³"[ℓ],¬"[ℓ][p'] T£ fℓ' . 
 
Second, if the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′′ chooses not to carry out any 
screening when the patent it holds on the brand k′′ expires, then it will shut down its R&D 
activities and exit the market. Under this scenario, the discounted profit – discounted to the time 
the patent on the brand k′′ expires – earned by the brand k′ from time l'',&(( + m until time l',&( + m is given by 
(39)    £ ± = E ;¤/¥;¦"'',8'';u0p'J, , , k(, Ω;[]K¦"',8'Uu¦"'',8''Uu .   
 
At time l',&( + m, when the patent it holds on the brand k′ expires, this firm might choose to 
screen one of the remaining compounds, say the compound /[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , )[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , ,[ℓ],!"[ℓ]0. If the 
screening is fruitful and results in a patentable drug, say kℓ = /[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , )[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , ,[ℓ],!"[ℓ]0, 
then the expected discounted payoff – discounted to time l' ,&( + m – obtained by this firm is 
given by 
 
(40)    £ ²ℓ [)[ℓ],!"[ℓ]] = E ;¤/¥;¦"',8';u0pℓ ,,kℓ, Ω;[] ¦"',8'Ueu¦"',8'Uu + ;¤u × 
	®pℓ 	Ω;[l',&' + 2m] ¡([ℓ(],!"[ℓ'] , )[ℓ(],!"[ℓ'] , ,[ℓ(],!"[ℓ']),« 3*?"[ℓ']J!"[ℓ']K,@"[ℓ']J!"[ℓ']K+[)[ℓ(],!"[ℓ']]. 
 
On the other hand, if the screening of the compound /[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , )[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , ,[ℓ],!"[ℓ]0 is not fruitful, 
then the expected discounted payoff – discounted to time l',&( + m – obtained by the firm after 
the patent on the brand k′ has expired is given by 
(41)   £ µℓ( = ®p( 	Ω;[l',&' + m] ¡([ℓ(],!"[ℓ'] , )[ℓ(],!"[ℓ'] , ,[ℓ(],!"[ℓ']),« 3*?"[ℓ']J!"[ℓ']K,@"[ℓ']J!"[ℓ']K+[)[ℓ(],!"[ℓ']]. 
 
The expected discounted payoff – discounted to the time the patent on the brand k′ expires – 
earned by the firm which holds the patent on the brand k( after this patent has expired, given that 
(i) the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′′ chooses not to carry out any screening when 
this patent expires, and (ii) the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′ chooses to screen the 
compound /[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , )[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , ,[ℓ],!"[ℓ]0 when the patent on the brand k′ expires, is then given 
by 
(42)    £ ·ℓ = −1[ℓ] + ∑ £ ²ℓ [)[ℓ],!"[ℓ]]3*?"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K,@"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K+[)[ℓ],!"[ℓ]]9"[ℓ],¬"[ℓ]q³"[ℓ],¬"[ℓ][p']  
                      +/1 − ∑ 3*?"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K,@"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K+[)[ℓ],!"[ℓ]]9"[ℓ],¬"[ℓ]q³"[ℓ],¬"[ℓ][p'] 0£ µℓ( .                   
 
The expected discounted payoff – discounted to the time the patent on the brand k′′ expires – 
earned by the firm which holds the patent on the brand k( after this patent has expired, given that 
(i) the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′′ chooses not to carry out any screening when 
this patent expires, and (ii) the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′ chooses to screen the 
compound /[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , )[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , ,[ℓ],!"[ℓ]0 when the patent on the brand k′ expires, is then given 
by 
(43)    £ ¸ = £ ± + ;¤(¦"',8';¦"'',8'')max	{0, £ ·ℓ , £ ·ℓ( }. 
 
We are now ready to give the explicit expression for (35) as  
(44) ®p' ¹k(, k((, Ω;[l'',&'' + m] º/([ℓ],!"[ℓ] , )[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , ,[ℓ],!"[ℓ]), 3*?"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K,@"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K+[)[ℓ],!"[ℓ]]0ℓ^ e «» 
=
ÅÆÇ




4.2.2 The Two Remaining Compounds are Located in the Same Chemical Library 
Suppose that the last two chemical compounds that have not been screened are both located in 
the ℎ	,ℎ,	´, i.e., the two remaining compounds are (,!"; , ),!"; , ,,!"; ) and (,!" , ),!" , ,,!"). Furthermore, their uncertain qualities are characterized by the same 
probability mass function 3*?"J!"; K,@"J!"; K+[),!"; ]. The firm which holds the patent on the 
brand k′′ has only two possible choices when this patent expires: to screen or not to screen.  
 
Suppose that the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′′ chooses to screen the penultimate 
compound immediately when the patent on the brand k′′ expires, and that the screening results 
in a patentable drug, say k = (,!"; , ),!"; , ,,!"; , l,!"; ), with l,!"; = l'',&(( + m, ),!"; ∈ ,!"; [k′], where 
(45)		,!"; [k′] =
														 ),!"; ¡),!"; ≥ )(,&(, (((,&(, )(,&(, ,(,&(), (,!"; , ),!"; , ,,!"; )) > i¢         
 
then the discounted value – discounted to time the patent on the brand k′′ expires – of the stream 
of profits earned by the newly discovered drug during the time interval [l'',&'' + m, l',&' + m) is  
(46)    E ;¤*¥;¦"'',8'';u+pPJ, ,k , k(, Ω;[]K¦"',8'Uu¦"'',8''Uu , 
 
Furthermore, at time l(,&( + m, when the patent on the brand k′ expires, the two pharmaceutical 
firms find themselves exactly in the situation analyzed in Sub-section 3.4.1, but with their roles 
reversed. Now there is only one compound left for screening, namely the 
compound	(,!" , ),!" , ,,!"), and the two brands marketed by the two pharmaceutical firms are k′ and k , with the patent on the former brand being granted before that on the latter. 
Furthermore, the probability mass function that characterizes the uncertain quality of the 
compound (,!" , ),!" , ,,!") is now revised – in light of the revealed quality of the penultimate 
compound – to be 3*?"J!"K,@"J!"K+[),!"]. where <J$K = <J$ − 1K + ),!";  and  @"J!"K = 1 +
 @"J!"; K.  Also, according to Lemma 1, the revised distribution that characterizes our beliefs 
concerning the uncertain quality of the last remaining compound is stochastically increasing in 
the quality of the newly discovered drug. Under such a scenario, the expected discounted payoff 
– discounted to the time the patent on the brand k′ expires – earned by the firm which holds the 
patent on the brand k  after the patent on the brand k′ has expired is given by 
(47)   £eG ),!";  = ®pP k , k(, Ω;[l',&' + m] ¡(,!" , ),!" , ,,!")	,« 3*?"J!"K,@"J!"K+[),!"].  
 
The discounted payoff – discounted to the time the patent on the brand k′′ expires – earned by 
the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′′ under the event that the screening of the 
compound (,!"; , ),!"; , ,,!"; )  results in a patentable drug is then given by 
(48)						£e ),!";  = E ;¤/¥;¦"'',8'';u0pPJ,,k , k(, Ω;[]K¦"',8'Uu¦"'',8''Uu  																																																										+	;¤(¦"',8';¦"'',8'')£eG[),!"; ].   
 
On the other hand, if the screening of the compound (,!"; , ),!"; , ,,!"; )  is not fruitful, then 
the two firms also find themselves in the same situation analyzed in Sub-section 3.4.1, with (,!" , ),!" , ,,!")  being the last chemical compound. Under this event, this firm might give up, 
or it might screen the last compound immediately after the first unsuccessful attempt. The 
expected discounted payoff – discounted to the instant the patent on the brand k′′ expires – that 
this firm earns after the first unsuccessful attempt is 
(49)    £ee[),!"; ] = ®p(( k(, k((, Ω;[l'',&'' + m] ¡(,!" , ),!" , ,,!"),« 3*?"J!"K,@"J!"K+[),!"]	. 
 
If the first screening was not fruitful, and if £ee[),!"; ] > 0, then this firm will continue the 
search by screening the remaining compound, namely the compound (,!" , ),!" , ,,!") 
immediately, and under this scenario, (49) represents the discounted payoff net of R&D cost – 
discounted to the time the patent on the brand k′′ expires – that is yielded by the second 
screening. 
 
The expected discounted profit net of R&D cost made by the firm which holds the patent on the 
brand k′′ – discounted to the time this patent expires – if this firm chooses to screen the 
penultimate compound immediately after  the patent on the brand k′′ expires is then given by 
(50)   £ef = −1 + ∑ £e [),!"; ]3*?"J!"; K,@"J!"; K+[),!"; ]9",¬"NP∈³",¬"NP[p']  
                          +/1 − ∑ 3*?"J!"; K,@"J!"; K+[),!"; ]	9",¬"NP∈³",¬"NP[p'] 0£ee[),!"; ]              
 
Let 
(51) ®p'' Ék(, k((, Ω;Jl'',&'' + mK Ê/*,&, ),& , ,,&+0&^!"; !" , 3*?"J!"; K,@"J!"; K+ ),!"; «Ë 																														= 	{0, £ef}    
 
denote the expected discounted payoff – discounted to the time the patent on the brand k′′ 
expires – for the firm which holds this patent, given that the remaining two compounds are the 
last two compounds in the ℎ	,ℎ,	´ and that the uncertain quality of each of these  
two compounds is characterized by the common probability mass function 3*?"J!"; K,@"J!"; K+[),!"; ]	. The firm which holds the patent on the brand k′′ will only carry out 
the screening if this expected payoff is positive. 
 
The information generated from the screening of the penultimate compound in the ℎ	,ℎ,	´ resolves not only the quality of this compound, but it also yields 
information about the potential quality of the last compound. The information thus obtained on 
the potential quality of the last compound will have a bearing on the decision whether or not this 
compound will be screened. According to Lemma 1, if the screening of the penultimate 
compound is not particularly fruitful, then expectations concerning the potential quality of the 
last compound will be much lowered, and this compound might never be screened, especially 
when there are many brands competing for a limited amount of drug expenditures. On the other 
hand, if the screening of the penultimate compound is fruitful, then the potential quality of the 
last compound will also be stochastically larger. However, this does not necessarily mean that 
the last compound will be screened for a possible new drug. Indeed, if the screening of the 
penultimate compound is particularly fruitful, then no efforts will be expended in screening the 
last compound, as asserted by the following proposition: 
 
PROPOSITION 8: Suppose that the penultimate compound in the ℎ	,ℎ,	´ is 
screened by the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′′ when this patent expires. If ),!"; , 
the revealed quality of the penultimate compound, is particularly high, then the probability that 
the quality of the last compound in the ℎ	,ℎ,	´ is higher than ),!";   – so that the 
drug developed from the last compound can be patented – is particularly low, and this means 
that the last compound will not be screened. 
 
PROOF: The proof and a numerical example in support of Proposition 8 is given in Annex J. 
 
Let 
(52) ®p' ¹k(, k((, Ω;[l'',&'' + m] º*(,&, ),&, ,,&)+&^!"; !" , 3*?"J!"; K,@"J!"; K+[),!"; ]	«» 
 
denote the expected discounted payoff – discounted to the time the patent on the brand k′′ 
expires – for the firm which holds the patent on the brand k(, given that the remaining two 
compounds are the last two compounds in the ℎ	,ℎ,	´ and that the uncertain 
quality of each of these  two compounds is characterized by the common probability mass 
function 3*?"J!"; K,@"J!"; K+[),!"; ]. This expected discounted payoff can be computed as 
follows. 
 
First, if the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′′ chooses to screen the compound (,!"; , ),!"; , ,,!"; )  immediately after the patent on the brand k′′ has expired, and if the 
screening results in a patentable drug, say k = (,!"; , ),!"; , ,,!"; , l,!"; ), with l,!"; =l'' ,&(( + m, then the expected discounted payoff – discounted to the time the patent on the brand k′′ expires – for the firm that holds the patent on the brand k′ is given by 
(53)    £e° = E ;¤/¥;¦"'',8'';u0p'J,, k , k(, Ω;[]K¦"',8'Uu¦"'',8''Uu + ;¤(¦"',8';¦"'',8'') × 
																											®p( 	k , k(, Ω;[l',&' + m] ¡(,!" , ),!" , ,,!"),« 3*?"J!"K,@"J!"K+[),!"].  
 
In (53), Ω;Jl',&' + mK = Ω;[l'',&'' + m]⋃{k′}.  
 
If the screening of the compound (,!"; , ),!"; , ,,!"; ) is a failure, then immediately after 
this screening, we have the situation analyzed in Sub-section 3.4.1, and the expected discounted 
payoff – discounted to the time the patent on the brand k′′ expires – for the firm which holds the 
patent on the brand k′ is given by 
(54)   £e± = ®p( 	k(, k((, Ω;[l'',&'' + m] ¡(,!" , ),!" , ,,!"),« 3*?"J!"K,@"J!"K+[),!"].  
 
Thus, under the scenario that the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′′ chooses to screen 
the compound (,!"; , ),!"; , ,,!"; )   immediately after the patent on the brand k′′ has 
expired, then the expected discounted payoff – discounted to the time the patent on the brand k′′ 
expires – for the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′ is given by 
(55)    £e² = ∑ £e°3*?"J!"; K,@"J!"; K+[),!"; ]9",¬"NP∈³",¬"NP[p']  
                           +/1 − ∑ 3*?"J!"; K,@"J!"; K+[),!"; ]9",¬"NP∈³",¬"NP[p'] 0£e±. 
 
Second, if the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′′ chooses not to carry out any 
screening when the patent on the brand k′′ expires, then the expected discounted profit – 
discounted to the time the patent on the brand k′′ expires – earned by the brand k′ from time l'' ,&(( + m until time l' ,&( + m is given by 
(56)    £eµ = E ;¤/¥;¦"'',8'';u0p'J,, k(, Ω;[]K¦"',8'Uu¦"'',8''Uu .   
 
Furthermore, the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′ is the only one left in the R&D 
sector. At time l' ,&( + m, when the patent on the brand k′ expires, this firm might choose not to 
screen one of the two remaining compounds, and the game ends at time l',&( + m. On the other 
hand if it chooses to screen the penultimate compound, and obtains a patentable drug, say 
k = /,!"; , ),!"; , ,,!"; , l,!"; 0, with l,!"; = l(,&( + m, then the expected discounted 
payoff – discounted to time l',&( + m – obtained by this firm is given by 
(57)    £e· = E ;¤/¥;¦"',8';u0pPJ, ,k , Ω;[]K¦"',8'Ueu¦"',8'Uu  
																								+;¤u	®pP 	Ω;[l',&' + 2m] ¡(,!" , ),!" , ,,!"),« 3*?"J!"K,@"J!"K+[),!"]. 
 
On the other hand, if the screening of the compound /,!"; , ),!"; , ,,!"; , l,!"; 0  is not 
fruitful, then the expected discounted payoff – discounted to time l',&( + m – obtained by this 
firm after the patent on the brand k′ has expired is given by 
(58)   £e¸ = ®p( 	Ω;[l',&' + m] ¡(,!" , ),!" , ,,!"),« 3*?"J!"K,@"J!"K+[),!"]. 
 
The expected discounted payoff – discounted to the time the patent on the brand k′ expires – 
earned by the firm which holds the patent on the brand k( after this patent has expired, given that 
(i) the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′′ chooses not to carry out any screening when 
this patent expires, and (ii) the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′ chooses to screen the 
compound (,!"; , ),!"; , ,,!"; )  when the patent on the brand k′ expires, is then given by 
(59)    £fG = −1 + ∑ £e·3*?"J!"; K,@"J!"; K+[),!"; ]9",¬"NP∈³",¬"NP[p']  
                                  +/1 − ∑ 3*?"J!"; K,@"J!"; K+ ),!"; 9",¬"NP∈³",¬"NP[p'] 0£e¸. 
The expected discounted payoff – discounted to the time the patent on the brand k′′ expires – 
earned by the firm which holds the patent on the brand k( after this patent has expired,  given 
that (i) the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′′ chooses not to carry out any screening 
when this patent expires, and (ii) the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′ chooses to 
screen the compound (,!"; , ),!"; , ,,!"; ) when the patent on the brand k′ expires, is then 
given by 
(60)    £f = £eµ + ;¤(¦"',8';¦"'',8'')max	{0, £fG}. 
 
We are now ready to give the explicit expression for (52) as 





                   
 
4.3  Three or More Remaining Unscreened Chemical Compounds 
When there remain three unscreened compounds, they might be located in three different 
chemical libraries or two of them in the same chemical library and the third one in another 
chemical library. The analysis carried out in Sub-section 3.4.2 can be used as the basis for the 
backward induction needed to solve the sub-game in which three unscreened compounds remain. 
Because of the complexity of the model, a simple recurrent relation between the sub-games does 
not exist. 
 
As we move backward through time to the root of the game tree, we find fewer and fewer brands 
on the market and less and less information on the potential qualities of the unscreened 
compounds. The small number of brands on the market at the beginning means less competition 
on the product market. However, the small number of compounds screened also means less 
information is available on the potential qualities of the unscreened compounds, and this means 
more risk is involved in searching for a new drug. According to Toully et al. (2002), 
international pharmaceutical companies now concentrate their R&D efforts not on well-known 
drugs but on very risky new drugs. This choice might reflect the presumption that the risk 
involved in carrying out R&D activities in less well-known libraries might be more than 
compensated for by the market share obtained if the R&D activities are fruitful.    
 
5 Concluding Remarks 
Using a dynamic model of optimal patent design and in the presence of information externalities, 
the evolution of technological progress in the context of a pharmaceutical industry is studied. 
The preceding literature on the topic works with only one brand, the brand with the highest 
quality. As well, the demand is assumed to be completely inelastic. In the conventional models 
of patent design the role of competitive fringe firms is also discussed implicitly. The model 
discussed in this research is a continuous in-time dynamic model which provides a rigorous 
structure for studying the context. It considers several differentiated products, both those whose 
patents are still in force and those whose patents have already expired, at any point in time. 
Furthermore the demand for a brand is taken to be a function of income, its price, and the prices 
of other brands. The interaction of the fringe firm with other patent-holding firms is also 
explicitly considered under this framework. Unlike the previous literature on the context, the 
model incorporates both product and process innovation concepts and provides real guidelines to 
measure the patent breadth. Under this structure, pharmaceutical firms with an active drug 
discovery program behave strategically in their R&D and in the product markets. Under this 
structure, three scenarios are discussed: the first scenario refers to the case where all chemical 
compounds in all chemical libraries are already screened. The second scenario discusses the case 
where the set of unscreened chemical compounds include only one element. Under this scenario 
it is shown that the firm which holds the earlier-expiring patent only chooses to screen the last 
compound, when the patent it holds expires, if the expected discounted payoff net of R&D costs 
yielded by this action is positive. The expected discounted payoff net of R&D costs obtained by 
this firm is then decreasing in the cost of screening; increasing in the cumulative quality 
discovered in the past screenings of the compounds in the chemical library, and decreasing in the 
number of past screenings carried out in this chemical library. The payoff is also higher if the 
marginal cost of the drug manufactured from the last compound is lower, and higher if the 
qualities (marginal costs) of all the other brands – generic drugs as well as the brands whose 
patents have not expired – are lower (higher). It is also shown that if the firm which holds the 
earlier-expiring patent chooses not to screen the last compound when the patent it holds expires, 
then neither will the firm which holds the patent on the rival brand choose to screen the last 
compound when this patent expires. The expected discounted payoff earned by the rival brand is 
shown to be decreasing in the cumulative quality discovered in the chemical library, and 
increasing in the number of past screenings in the chemical library; increasing (decreasing) in the 
quality (marginal cost) of the brand and decreasing (increasing) in the qualities (marginal costs) 
of the generic drugs as well as the brand whose patent has not expired. The third scenario refers 
to the case where the set of unscreened chemical compounds includes two elements. These 
elements may be located in two different chemical libraries, or both being located in the same 
chemical library. Under the first case the analysis suggests that if neither compound is screened 
by the firm which holds the earlier-expiring patent when it stands alone as the single remaining 
compound, then it will not be screened either by this firm when it is one of the two remaining 
compounds. It is also shown that the expected discounted payoff net of R&D costs that the firm 
which holds the earlier-expiring patent obtains by screening each of the last two compounds is 
positive, then, every other thing equal, the compound with the lower screening cost should be 
screened first, the compound from which a new drug with much higher marginal cost is 
manufactured should not be screened first, and the compound with the potential quality that is 
stochastically much larger should be screened first. When the elements are both located in the 
same chemical library the penultimate compound in the chemical library is screened by the firm 
which holds the earlier-expiring patent, and if the revealed quality of the penultimate compound, 
is particularly high, then the probability that the quality of the last compound in the chemical 
library is higher than the quality of the penultimate compound is particularly low, which means 
the last compound will not be screened.  
 
This work briefly discusses the concepts of patent length and breadth. An interesting extension to 
this work would be to use the model’s formulation to abstract the optimal values for the breadth 
and length of patent. The model also provides a rigorous structure for analyzing the context 
under a strategic timing framework. A possible extension to the current work would then be a 
discussion that offers insights on the impact of strategic timing and the patent race on the subject.  
 
  
Annex A: The Proof of Proposition 1 
PROOF: A rise in the effective marginal cost ,(,&( of the brand k′ = ((,&(, )(,&(, ,(,&(, l(,&() 
shifts both curves Φp( and Φp(( upward, inducing a rise in the effective prices of both brands. 
Because the expenditure on the numéraire good is a constant fraction of [] + }p( +}p(( +,,&	, which is higher at the new equilibrium, total expenditures on drugs must be lower under the 
new equilibrium. 
 
Using the fact that [] + }p( +}p(( is higher under the equilibrium, we can assert that the 
demand for and a fortiori the total revenues  earned by the generic drugs must be higher under 
the new equilibrium, and this means the market share for generic drugs is higher under the 
equilibrium. 
 
The rise in }p(, by raising p(([] = [] + }p( + ,,&, shifts the inverse demand curve for p(( 
upward by the same proportion at each level of demand, and this means an upward shift in the 
marginal revenue curve associated with this inverse market demand curve. At the new 
equilibrium, the output, the total revenue, and the profits earned by the brand k(( are all higher. 
Also, the market share for the brand k′′ is higher under the new equilibrium. 
 
Using the results just proven that the market share for the brand k′′ and the market share for 
generic drugs are both higher under the new equilibrium, we can assert that the market share for 
the brand k′ is lower under the new equilibrium.    
Intuitively, we should expect that a higher effective marginal cost of a brand reduces its 
profitability. However, the technical arguments required to support this intuition are not 
straightforward. On the one hand, a rise in the effective marginal cost of the brand k(, every 
other thing equal, reduces the profit earned by this brand. On the other hand, the firm that holds 
the patent on the rival brand k′′ behaves strategically by raising the per-therapeutic-unit price of 
its own brand, and this action induces an upward shift in the demand curve for the brand k(, 
which has a positive impact on the profitability of the brand k(. Because these two effects are in 
opposite directions, the net impact of a higher effective marginal cost of the brand k′ on its own 
profitability cannot be determined unambiguously without some efforts. First, let us rewrite (13), 
the profit earned by this brand, as follows:  
(A.1)    *}p' 	− c',&'+ S x'[]x' 	 − GT = S1 − "',8'x' 	 T S x'[]x' 	 − GT }p'	. 
 
Note that (A.1) expresses the profit earned by the brand k( as the product of its total revenue and 
the factor S1 − "',8'x' 	 T. We have already argued that the total revenue earned by this brand is 
lower at the new equilibrium. Hence we will succeed in showing that the profit this brand earns 
will be lower under the new equilibrium if we can show that the ratio 
"',8'x' 	  is higher under the 
new equilibrium. To this end, recall that the equilibrium effective price of the brand k′ is the 
fixed point of the composite map Φp(; that is, 
(A.2)    }p( =  κ0 √κ1c',&'[] + c,& + κ1[]Ux'U",8"'',8''κ0 , 
 
Squaring (A.2), and then rearranging the result, we obtain 
(A.3)    x'"',8' =  x'~√κ c',&'[] + c,& + √P[]Ux'U",8"'',8''~ .     
 
It can be seen immediately that the expression on the right-hand side of (20) is strictly decreasing 
in }p(. Hence the ratio "',8'x' 	  will be higher under the new equilibrium, as desired.      ■ 
 
Annex B: The Proof of Proposition 2 
PROOF: A rise in the effective marginal cost ,,& of the generic drugs shifts both curves Φp( and Φp(( upward, inducing a rise in the per-therapeutic-unit prices of both brands. Because the 
expenditure on the numéraire good is a constant fraction of [] + }p( +}p(( + ,,&	, which is 
higher at the new equilibrium, total expenditures on drugs must be lower under the new 
equilibrium.  
 
The rise in }p( and ,,& raises p(([], which shifts the inverse demand curve for p(( upward by 
the same proportion at each level of demand, and this means an upward shift in the marginal 
revenue curve associated with this inverse market demand curve. At the new equilibrium, the 
output, the total revenue, and the profits earned by the brand k(( are all higher. Also, because the 
total expenditures on drugs are lower under the new equilibrium, the market share for the brand k′′ is also higher. The results just established for the brand k′′ also hold for the brand k(. 
 
At the new equilibrium the lower total expenditures on drugs coupled with the higher 
expenditure on each of the brands k′ and k′′ imply a lower level of total revenues earned by 
generic drugs. Also, because the market share for the brand k′ and the market share for the brand k′′ are both higher under the new equilibrium, the market share for generic drugs must be lower 
under the new equilibrium.                    ■ 
 
Annex C: The Proof of Proposition 3 
PROOF: Statement (i) is obvious. To prove (ii), first note that £e[),!"] is increasing in ),&, and 
then apply Lemma 1, which asserts that the potential quality of the last compound is 
stochastically increasing in <J$K and =J$K. Statement (iii) follows immediately from the 
properties of £ [),!"].          ■ 
 
Annex D: The Proof of Lemma 2 
PROOF: If the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′′ chooses to screen the last compound 
when the patent it holds on the brand k′′ expires, then at each age below l',&( − l'',&(( during its 
statutory life, the newly discovered drug has to compete against the brand k′ whose patent has 
not expired and which is sold above its marginal cost, as well as against the generic drugs in 
Ω;Jl'',&'' + mK. After that and until the end of its statutory life, the newly discovered drug has to 
compete against all the generic drugs in Ω;Jl',&' + mK = Ω;Jl'',&'' + mK⋃{k′}.  
 
Now suppose that Af ≤ 0; that is, the firm which holds the patent on the brand ω′′ chooses not 
to screen the last compound. If the rival firm, which holds the patent on the brand ω′ chooses to 
screen the last compound when the patent it holds on the brand ω′ expires, and if the screening 
leads to a patentable drug, then at each age during its statutory life the newly discovered drug has 
to compete against all the generic drugs in Ω;JτÍ',Î' + LK = Ω;JτÍ'',Î'' + LK⋃{ω′}. Thus, at each 
age during its statutory life, the patent on the newly discovered drug allows its holder to earn 
more or the same profit under the scenario that it is discovered by the firm which holds the patent 
on the brand ω′′ than under the scenario that it is discovered by the firm which holds the patent 
on the brand ω(.                      ■ 
 
Annex E: The Proof of Proposition 4 
PROOF: If the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′′ chooses not to screen the last 
compound when the patent on the brand k′′ expires, then the discounted payoff for the firm 
which holds the patent on the brand k′ is given by £±. If the firm which holds the patent on the 
brand k′′ chooses to screen the last compound when the patent on the brand k′′ expires, then the 
discounted payoff for the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′ is still given by £± if the 
screening is not fruitful. On the other hand, if the screening yields a patentable drug, then the 
discounted payoff for the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′ is given by £°[),!"], 
which is lower than £±, and which is decreasing in the quality of the newly discovered drug. 
Invoking Lemma 1, we can then assert that the discounted payoff for the firm which holds the 
patent on the brand k′ is lower when the potential quality of the last compound is stochastically 
larger. That is, when the cumulative quality discovered in the ℎ	,ℎ,	´ is higher 
and when the size of this chemical library is smaller, the expected discounted payoff obtained by 
the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′ will be lower. The remaining statements of 
Proposition 5 can be proved by applying Propositions 1 and 2.                  ■   
   
Annex F: The Proof of Lemma 3 
PROOF: (i) Suppose that the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′′ chooses to screen the 
compound ([ℓ],!"[ℓ] , )[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , ,[ℓ],!"[ℓ]) first.  
 
If the screening is fruitful, then during the time interval [l'',&'' + m, l',&' + m) the newly 
discovered drug competes against the same set of brands – the generic drugs in Ω;Jl'',&(( + mK 
and the brand k′ whose patent is still in force – as if it were discovered under the hypothesis that 
it stands alone as the last remaining compound. At time l',&' + m, when the patent on the brand k′ expires, the firm which holds the patent on this brand will choose not to screen the compound 
([ℓ(5,!"4ℓ'5 , )4ℓ(5,!"4ℓ'5 , ,4ℓ(5,!"4ℓ'5). Indeed, if the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′ 
chooses to screen the compound (4ℓ(5,!"4ℓ'5 , )4ℓ(5,!"4ℓ'5 , ,4ℓ(5,!"4ℓ'5) when the patent it holds on the 
brand k′ expires and if the screening is fruitful, then the new drug it discovered will face 
competition from the drug manufactured from the brand  (4ℓ5,!"4ℓ5 , )4ℓ5,!"4ℓ5 , ,4ℓ5,!"4ℓ5) – both 
before and after the patent on this brand expires – as well as from the generic drugs in 
Ω;Jl'',&(( + mK⋃{k′}.  Such an action will yield an expected discounted payoff net of R&D 
costs that is lower than £µℓ( ≤ 0, which is clearly not profitable. Thus, if the firm which holds the 
patent on the brand k′′ chooses to screen the compound (4ℓ5,!"4ℓ5 , )4ℓ5,!"4ℓ5 , ,4ℓ5,!"4ℓ5) first, then 
the expected discounted payoff net of R&D costs that it obtains will also be given by £µℓ ≤ 0. In 
the same manner, we can show that the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′′ will not 
choose to screen the compound (4ℓ(5,!"4ℓ'5 , )4ℓ(5,!"4ℓ'5 , ,4ℓ(5,!"4ℓ'5) first when the patent it holds on 
the brand k′′ expires. We have just shown that when £µℓ ≤ 0, ℓ = 1,2, the firm which holds the 
patent on the brand k′′ will shut down its R&D activities and exit the market after this patent has 
expired.    
 
Invoking Lemma 2, and using the assumption £µℓ ≤ 0, ℓ = 1,2,  we can assert that the firm which 
holds the patent on the brand k( will not choose to screen either compound – if it stands alone as 
the single remaining compound – when the patent it holds on the brand k( expires. The argument 
used for the firm which holds the patent on the brand k(( can be repeated to assert that the firm 
which holds the patent on the brand k( will also shut down its R&D activities and exit the 
market when the patent it holds on the brand k′ expires.  
 
(ii) Suppose that £µℓ > 0, £µℓ( ≤ 0. We have argued that if the firm which holds the patent on the 
brand k′′ screens the compound (4ℓ5,!"4ℓ5 , )4ℓ5,!"4ℓ5 , ,4ℓ5,!"4ℓ5) first, then the firm which holds 
the patent on the brand k′ will shut down its R&D activities and exit the market when the latter 
patent expires. This action yields an expected discounted payoff net of R&D costs £µℓ > 0 for the 
firm which holds the patent on the brand k((. Furthermore, because £µℓ( ≤ 0, when the patent on 
the new drug manufactured from the compound (4ℓ5,!"4ℓ5 , )4ℓ5,!"4ℓ5 , ,4ℓ5,!"4ℓ5) expires, the firm 
which holds the patent on the drug manufactured from this compound will not choose to screen 
the remaining compound because such an action will not yield a positive expected discounted 
payoff net of R&D costs. Thus the expected discounted payoff net of R&D costs that the firm 
which holds the patent on the brand k′′ obtains by screening the compound 
([ℓ],!"[ℓ] , )[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , ,[ℓ],!"[ℓ]) first will be equal to £µℓ > 0. 
 
If the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′′ chooses to screen the compound (Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K , )Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K , ,Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K) first, and if the screening is fruitful, then the newly discovered 
drug faces competition from same group of competing brands which exist under the scenario that 
the preceding compound stands alone as the single remaining compound, not as one of the two 
remaining compounds, plus possibly the potential competition from another new drug that the 
firm which holds the patent on the brand k′ might develop if the latter firm chooses to screen the 
compound ([ℓ],!"[ℓ] , )[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , ,[ℓ],!"[ℓ]). Thus, the expected discounted payoff net of R&D costs 
that is yielded by screening the compound (Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K , )Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K , ,Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K) first is not positive, 
and the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′′ will choose to screen the compound ([ℓ],!"[ℓ] , )[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , ,[ℓ],!"[ℓ]) immediately after the patent it holds on the brand k′′ expires. 
Furthermore, the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′ will not choose to screen the 
compound (Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K , )Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K , ,Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K) when the patent it holds on the brand k′ expires. 
This firm will shut down its R&D activities and exit the market at time l',&( + m, and so will the 
firm which holds the patent on the brand k′′ once the patent on the drug it develops from the 
compound ([ℓ],!"[ℓ] , )[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , ,[ℓ],!"[ℓ]) expires.                                  ■ 
 
Annex G: The Proof of Proposition 5 
PROOF: Let us rewrite £  ℓ  as follows: 
(G.1)   £  ℓ = −1[ℓ] + ∑ £ Gℓ [)[ℓ],!"[ℓ]]3*?"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K,@"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K+[)[ℓ],!"[ℓ]]9"[ℓ],¬"[ℓ]∈³"[ℓ],¬"[ℓ][p']    
					+ S1 − ∑ 3*?"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K,@"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K+[)[ℓ],!"[ℓ]]9"[ℓ],¬"[ℓ]∈³"[ℓ],¬"[ℓ][p'] T /*£µℓ' + 1[ℓ(]+ − 1[ℓ(]0 
     = ∑ £ Gℓ [)[ℓ],!"[ℓ]]3*?"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K,@"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K+[)[ℓ],!"[ℓ]]9"[ℓ],¬"[ℓ]∈³"[ℓ],¬"[ℓ][p']            
            +S1 − ∑ 3*?"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K,@"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K+[)[ℓ],!"[ℓ]]9"[ℓ],¬"[ℓ]∈³"[ℓ],¬"[ℓ][p'] T *£µℓ' + 1[ℓ(]+           
														− S1[ℓ] + S1 − ∑ 3*?"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K,@"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K+[)[ℓ],!"[ℓ]]9"[ℓ],¬"[ℓ]∈³"[ℓ],¬"[ℓ][p'] T 1[ℓ(]T                
             = Ð ℓ +Ðeℓ − Ðfℓ. 
 
Note that £µℓ' + 1[ℓ(] represents the discounted profits gross of R&D costs earned by the firm 
which holds the patent on the brand k′′ from the screening of the compound (Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K , )Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K , ,Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K) after the unfruitful screening of the compound ([ℓ],!"[ℓ] , )[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , ,[ℓ],!"[ℓ]). Also, recall that 
     
    £ Gℓ )[ℓ],!"[ℓ] = E ;¤/¥;¦"'',8'';u0pℓ ,,kℓ, k(, Ω;[] ¦"',8'Uu¦"'',8''Uu  																		+;¤(¦"',8';¦"'',8'')£ℓ¸[)[ℓ],!"[ℓ]]. 
 
Note that the higher is the cost of screening the compound (Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K , )Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K , ,Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K), the 
lower will be the incentive for the firm which holds the patent on the brand k′ to screen this 
compound in which process might discover a new drug that could compete against the drug 
discovered by screening the compound ([ℓ],!"[ℓ] , )[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , ,[ℓ],!"[ℓ]). Thus,  £ℓ¸[)[ℓ],!"[ℓ]] will 
be higher, the higher is the cost of screening the compound (Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K , )Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K , ,Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K). 
 
Suppose that		,[ℓ],$[ℓ] = ,[ℓ′],$[ℓ′] 	and 3*?"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K,@"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K+ = 3*?"[ℓ']J!"[ℓ']K,@"[ℓ']J!"[ℓ']K+, i.e., the 
marginal costs of the drugs manufactured from the two remaining compounds are the same, and 
the probability mass functions that characterize the potential qualities of the two remaining 
compounds are identical. If 1[ℓ] < 1[ℓ(], then £ Gℓ [)[ℓ],!"[ℓ]] > £ Gℓ' [)[ℓ(],!"[ℓ']], which implies 
Ð ℓ > Ð ℓ(, and £µℓ' + 1[ℓ(] = £µℓ + 1[ℓ], which implies Ðeℓ = Ðeℓ(. Also, if 1[ℓ] < 1[ℓ(], then 
     −Ðfℓ +Ðfℓ( = *1[ℓ(] − 1[ℓ]+∑ 3*?"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K,@"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K+[)[ℓ],!"[ℓ]]9"[ℓ],¬"[ℓ]∈³"[ℓ],¬"[ℓ][p'] > 0.  
 
Hence if 1[ℓ] < 1[ℓ(], then Ð ℓ −Ð ℓ( −Ðfℓ +Ðfℓ( > 0	 ⟺ £  ℓ > £  ℓ( ; that is, every other thing 
equal, the compound with the lower screening cost should be screened first.     ■  
 
Annex H: The Proof of Proposition 6 
PROOF: Suppose that 1[ℓ] = 1[ℓ′] and 3*?"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K,@"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K+ = 3*?"[ℓ′]J!"[ℓ′]K,@"[ℓ′]J!"[ℓ′]K+, i.e., the 
screening costs and the probability mass functions that characterize the potential qualities of the 
two remaining compounds are identical. Also, suppose that ,[ℓ′],!"[ℓ′] ≫ ,[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , i.e., the 
marginal cost of the drug manufactured from the compound (Jℓ′K,!"ℓ′ , )Jℓ′K,!"ℓ′ , ,Jℓ′K,!"ℓ′) is 
much higher than the marginal cost of the drug manufactured from the compound ([ℓ],!"[ℓ] , )[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , ,[ℓ],!"[ℓ]). The differential expected discounted payoff between the action of 
screening the compound ([ℓ],!"[ℓ] , )[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , ,[ℓ],!"[ℓ]) first and the action of screening the 
compound (Jℓ′K,!"ℓ′ , )Jℓ′K,!"ℓ′ , ,Jℓ′K,!"ℓ′) first is given by 
(H.1)	£  ℓ − £  ℓ( = 	−1[ℓ] + ∑ £ Gℓ [)[ℓ],!"[ℓ]]3*?"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K,@"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K+[)[ℓ],!"[ℓ]]9"[ℓ],¬"[ℓ]∈³"[ℓ],¬"[ℓ][p']  
−S−1[ℓ(] + ∑ £ Gℓ( [)[ℓ(],!"[ℓ']]3*?"[ℓ']J!"[ℓ']K,@"[ℓ']J!"[ℓ']K+[)[ℓ(],!"[ℓ']]9"[ℓ'],¬"[ℓ']∈³"[ℓ'],¬"[ℓ'][p'] T                 
	+ S1 − ∑ 3*?"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K,@"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K+[)[ℓ],!"[ℓ]]9"[ℓ],¬"[ℓ]∈³"[ℓ],¬"[ℓ][p'] T£µℓ' 
−S1 − ∑ 3*?"[ℓ']J!"[ℓ']K,@"[ℓ']J!"[ℓ']K+[)[ℓ(],!"[ℓ']]9"[ℓ'],¬"[ℓ']∈³"[ℓ'],¬"[ℓ'][p'] T£µℓ                             
                    = Ð°ℓ − Ð°ℓ( + Ð±ℓ( − Ð±ℓ;                         
 
Now if ,[ℓ′],!"[ℓ′]  is high enough so that the discounted profits earned from the new drug 
manufactured from the brand (Jℓ′K,!"ℓ′ , )Jℓ′K,!"ℓ′ , ,Jℓ′K,!"ℓ′)	 are not sufficient to justify the 
R&D costs, then £µℓ' = 0. When ,[ℓ(],!"[ℓ'] is high, but not prohibitive, £µℓ' > 0, but not too high. 
Under this scenario, if the compound ([ℓ],!"[ℓ] , )[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , ,[ℓ],!"[ℓ]) is screened first, and if the 
screening is fruitful, then the drug manufactured from this compound will not face much 
competition from the drug manufactured from the compound (Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K , )Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K , ,Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K). 




(H.2)    £  ℓ − £  ℓ( ≥ 
*£µℓ − £µℓ'+ − S1 − ∑ 3*?"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K,@"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K+[)[ℓ],!"[ℓ]]9"[ℓ],¬"[ℓ]∈³"[ℓ],¬"[ℓ][p'] T *£µℓ − £µℓ'+                         
                        = ∑ 3*?"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K,@"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K+[)[ℓ],!"[ℓ]]9"[ℓ],¬"[ℓ]∈³"[ℓ],¬"[ℓ][p'] *£µℓ − £µℓ'+ > 0,        
 
which implies that the compound ([ℓ],!"[ℓ] , )[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , ,[ℓ],!"[ℓ]) should be screened first.         ■ 
 
Annex I: The Proof of Proposition 7 
PROOF: The expected discounted payoff differential between screening the compound ([ℓ],!"[ℓ] , )[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , ,[ℓ],!"[ℓ]) first and screening the compound (Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K , )Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K , ,Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K) first is given by 
(I.1)		£  ℓ − £  ℓ( = −1[ℓ] + ∑ £ Gℓ [)[ℓ],!"[ℓ]]3*?"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K,@"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K+[)[ℓ],!"[ℓ]]9"[ℓ],¬"[ℓ]∈³"[ℓ],¬"[ℓ][p']   
+S1 − ∑ 3*?"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K,@"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K+[)[ℓ],!"[ℓ]]9"[ℓ],¬"[ℓ]∈³"[ℓ],¬"[ℓ][p'] T£µℓ'            
−S−1[ℓ(] + ∑ £ Gℓ' [)[ℓ(],!"[ℓ']]3*?"[ℓ']J!"[ℓ']K,@"[ℓ']J!"[ℓ']K+[)[ℓ(],!"[ℓ']]9"[ℓ'],¬"[ℓ']∈³"[ℓ'],¬"[ℓ'][p'] T −S1 −∑ 3*?"[ℓ']J!"[ℓ']K,@"[ℓ']J!"[ℓ']K+[)[ℓ(],!"[ℓ']]9"[ℓ'],¬"[ℓ']∈³"[ℓ'],¬"[ℓ'][p'] +£µℓ .     
                            
If we let 
(I.2)   Ð²ℓ = −1[ℓ] + ∑ £ Gℓ [)[ℓ],!"[ℓ]]3*?"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K,@"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K+[)[ℓ],!"[ℓ]],9"[ℓ],¬"[ℓ]∈³"[ℓ],¬"[ℓ][p']       (ℓ = 1,2), 
 
then we can rewrite (38) as 
(I.3)   ÔPPℓ ;ÔPPℓ'ÕÖℓ = 1 + S1 − ∑ 3*?"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K,@"[ℓ]J!"[ℓ]K+[)[ℓ],!"[ℓ]]9"[ℓ],¬"[ℓ]∈³"[ℓ],¬"[ℓ][p'] T Ô×ℓ'ÕÖℓ − ÕÖℓ'ÕÖℓ           
−S1 − ∑ 3*?"[ℓ']J!"[ℓ']K,@"[ℓ']J!"[ℓ']K+[)[ℓ(],!"[ℓ']]9"[ℓ'],¬"[ℓ']∈³"[ℓ'],¬"[ℓ'][p'] T Ô×ℓÕÖℓ.   
                            
If the potential quality of the compound ([ℓ],!"[ℓ] , )[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , ,[ℓ],!"[ℓ]) is stochastically much 
larger than the potential quality of the compound (Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K , )Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K , ,Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K), then £µℓ  is 
much larger than £µℓ(, i.e., Ô×ℓ'Ô×ℓ  is small. Furthermore, when the former compound is screened first, 
there is a greater chance of obtaining a drug of high quality from this action, and thus less chance 
that it will face competition from a possible new drug that might be discovered by the firm which 
holds the patent on the brand k′ when this patent expires, and this means Ð²ℓ ≅ £µℓ . Also, ÕÖℓ'ÕÖℓ  is 
small because Ð²ℓ( ≤ £µℓ' .  
 
Thus, when the potential quality of the compound ([ℓ],!"[ℓ] , )[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , ,[ℓ],!"[ℓ]) is stochastically 
much larger that of the compound (Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K , )Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K , ,Jℓ'K,!"Jℓ'K), we have 
(I.4)   ÔPPℓ ;ÔPPℓ'ÕÖℓ ≅ 1 − S1 − ∑ 3*?"[ℓ']J!"[ℓ']K,@"[ℓ']J!"[ℓ']K+[)[ℓ(],!"[ℓ']]9"[ℓ'],¬"[ℓ']∈³"[ℓ'],¬"[ℓ'][p'] T      
                       = ∑ 3*?"[ℓ']J!"[ℓ']K,@"[ℓ']J!"[ℓ']K+[)[ℓ(],!"[ℓ']]9"[ℓ'],¬"[ℓ']∈³"[ℓ'],¬"[ℓ'][p'] > 0,        
 
and this means that the compound ([ℓ],!"[ℓ] , )[ℓ],!"[ℓ] , ,[ℓ],!"[ℓ]) should be screened first.         ■ 
 
Annex J: The Proof of Proposition 8 
PROOF: The probability mass function that characterizes the potential quality of the last 
compound in the ℎ	,ℎ,	´, after the quality of the penultimate compound has been 
revealed, is 3*?"J!"K,@"J!"K+[),!"], where <J$K = <J$ − 1K + ),!";  and =J$K =   U PI"¬"NP.  
The probability that the quality of the last compound exceeds ),!";  is 
(J.1)    
Ø´  ),!" > ),!"; ¯),!"; «¢ =
																										E /∑ ;6 679!9Ù9",¬"NP 0 >/?"J!"; KU9",¬"NP,@"J!"K0[2]2.FG  
 
With a heavy dose of limiting arguments, we can show that Ø´  ),!" > ),!"; ¯),!"; «¢ → 0 
when ),!"; → ∞. However, we eschew these technical arguments and offer a numerical 
example to illustrate this result. For the simple numerical example, suppose that there are three 
brands – one generic drug and two leading brands – on the market. The quality of the generic 
drug is 3. As usual the two leading brands, whose patents have not expired, are denoted by k′′ 
and k( , respectively, with the patent of the former brand being granted before the patent on the 
latter. Also, for simplicity suppose that the brand k′′ is obtained from screening the *$ −2)ℎ	,}o in the ℎ	,ℎ,	´ and that $ = 3. The quality of the brand k′′ is 
assumed to be 4. As for the brand k(, it is obtained from a different chemical library, and its 
quality is assumed to be 5.  The following table presents the results of the numerical exercise. 
 
 
Table H.1. The Probability that the Last Compound in a Chemical Library will be Screened as a Function of 
the Revealed Quality of the Penultimate Compound ),!";  (the revealed quality of the penultimate 
compound) 
Ø´  ),!" > ),!"; ¯),!"; «¢				(the 
probability that the drug developed from the 
last compound meets the leading breadth 














As can be seen from the preceding table, the probability that the drug manufactured from the last 
compound meets the leading breadth requirement for a patent declines steadily as the revealed 
quality of the penultimate compound rises. When the outcome of the screening of the 
penultimate compound is particularly fruitful, this probability is so low to render the expected 
discounted profit yielded by the potential new drug developed from the last compound 
insufficient to cover its R&D costs.                ■  


















Arrow, K. and S. Chang (1982), “Optimal Pricing, Use, and Exploration of Uncertain Resource Stocks,” 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 9, 1-10. 
Cairns, R. and N.V. Quyen (1998), “Optimal Exploration for and Exploitation of Heterogenous Mineral 
Deposits,” Journal of Environmental Economics and  
      Management, 35, 164-189.  
Chow, G.C. (1981),  Economic Analysis by Control Methods, New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Eaton, J. and S. Khortum (2001), “Technology, Trade, and Growth: A Unified Framework,” European 
Economic Review, 451, 742-755. 
Gilbert, R. and C. Shapiro  (1990), “Optimal Patent Length and Breadth,” The Rand Journal of 
Economics, 21, 106-112. 
Klemperer, P.  (1990), “How Broad Should the Scope of Patent be?” The Rand Journal of Economics, 
21, 113-130. 
Mansfield, E. (1961), “Technical Change and the Rate of Imitation,” Econometrica, 29, 741-766. 
------------- (1984), “R&D and Innovation: Some Empirical Findings,” in Zvi Griliches, ed., R&D, Patents 
and Productivity, Chicago: University of Chicago Press for the National Bureau of Economic 
Research.  
Nordhaus, W. (1969), Invention, Growth, and Welfare, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press. 
------------- (1972), “The Optimal Life of the Patent: Reply,” American Economic Review, 62, 428-431. 
O’Donoghue, T., S. Scotchmer, and J. Thisse (1998), “Patent Breadth, Patent Life, and the Pace of 
Technological Progress,” Journal of Economics & Management  Strategy, 7(1), 1-32.  
Pearlman, R. S. (2009), “Novel Software Tools for Addressing Chemical Diversity,”  1995-2009 
Network Science Corporation. 
Quyen, N. V. (1991), “Exhaustible Resources: A Theory of Exploration,” Review of  Economic Studies, 
58, 777-789. 
Scotchmer, S. and  J. Green (1990), “Novelty and Disclosure in Patent Law,” The  Rand Journal of 
Economics, 21, 131-146. 
Takalo, T. (2001), "On the optimal patent policy," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic 
Association, 14(1), 33-40. 
Tandon, P. (1982), “Optimal patents with compulsory licensing, ”Journal of Political Economy, 90, 470-
486. 
Toully, V. (2002), Pharmaceutical Industry: Innovation and Economic Performance: A Study on Behalf 
of Laboratoires Internationaux de Recherch, 18 pages 
 
